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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the thesis to analyze the India’s nuclear weapons command and 
control dilemma as a consequence of its 1998 nuclear tests. The small size of India’s 
nuclear weapons does not imply that its command and control structure would be simple. 
It would require the same infrastructure, capabilities, and operating concepts possessed 
by countries with larger number of nuclear weapons, but maybe on a smaller scale. A 
small arsenal is easy to control, but then it is vulnerable to attack, and hence the issue of 
command and control becomes more complex. India’s No-First-Use (NFU) policy and 
the de-mated nuclear posture also make the command and control of nuclear weapons 
look simple, affordable, and easy to implement. But the nuclear policy and posture must 
be examined through the prism of peacetime, crisis and wartime situations. The smooth 
transition from peacetime to crisis and, if required, to wartime demands a robust 
command and control system.  
This thesis examines the requirements and then provides recommendations for the 
command and control structure for Indian nuclear operations. The thesis will investigates 
the U.S. command and control model and draws lessons for a suitable option for India. 
While NFU has many challenges, it can be effective provided that India adopts an 
operational capability of Launch After Attack (LAA), which would require a significant 
upgrade of command and control structure and procedures. In particular, this thesis 
demonstrates the role that civilians and military could effectively play to strengthen 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Simple intuition suggests that omitting command parameters from 
consideration invites miscalculation. Such a practice is ipso facto grounds 
for contesting standard analytic conclusions and imposing a heavy burden 
of proof on them. And if the opportunity for miscalculation is as large as it 
seems, the much strategic enumeration is not only misleading but wrong. 
Command performance is quite possibly not just an important factor but 
the key determinant of real strategic capability…Deficiencies in command 
performance could be cause for serious concern regardless of the 
resilience of the forces and the strategy to which they are subordinated. If 
command and control fails, almost nothing else matters.1   
Bruce G. Blair 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Given the destructive potential of a nuclear weapon and the complexities involved 
in a nuclear employment operation, which range from establishment of nuclear doctrine 
based on threat, involvement of multiple organizations (political and military), 
contrasting control methods (technical and organizational) and huge cost implications, 
the command and control of nuclear weapons is a challenging and daunting task. For 
many years, regardless of its intrinsic significance, the nuclear command and control 
system has remained marginalized and the nuclear forces have taken all the attention of 
the analysts and policy makers. According to Bruce G. Blair, nuclear bombers, 
submarines, and land missiles figure prominently in debate, while the physical and 
procedural arrangements created to operate those forces escape notice.2  
Between the Soviet Union and the United States, their nuclear weapons and forces 
were compared with respect to quantity and quality, and as a result of it there were great 
advancements in the quality of nuclear weapons through modernization and 
quantitatively the focus was on massive deployment of nuclear weapons during the Cold 
War. The imbalance between nuclear command and control system and the massive 
development and deployment of nuclear weapons can be attributed to the fact that the 
                                                 
1 Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1985), 3-4. 
2 Ibid., 1. 
2 
effectiveness of the nuclear command and control system cannot be ascertained with the 
available means, and it takes a long time to build up a formidable command and control 
system. On the other side, “seeing is believing” in the case of nuclear weapons and 
forces. Nuclear command and control is the most demanding at the time of crisis and 
plays a considerable role during these testing times. It did so during the crises between 
the Soviet Union and the United States such as Korea (1952), Vietnam (1954) and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). With the experience gained during each crisis, the command 
and control evolved toward attaining higher standards of robustness. The aftermath of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis forced President Kennedy to order a review of the U.S. nuclear 
command and control system which lead to the creation of “Football”.3    
At the heart of nuclear command and control lies the always/never dilemma.4 The 
always/never problem is also associated with conventional weapons, but it is absolutely 
essential in the case of nuclear weapons because of their extreme destructive capabilities. 
The always/never dilemma spells out the recipe of a command and control system. It 
means that the system should always deliver whenever asked for by the authorized leader 
and never unless it is authorized by a competent authority. Two threats exacerbate the 
always/never (or positive control/negative control) dilemma: the potential for unwanted 
use and the potential for decapitation.5  The civilian leader needs to allow for the problem 
of unwanted use, and at the same time should not cross a certain threshold so that it 
becomes a problem of decapitation whereby a successful first strike against his nation 
destroys the nuclear weapons or command and control facilities such that retaliation 
becomes unachievable. There is a dilemma here as there are trade-offs between positive 
and negative control and measures designed to improve one type of control frequently 
hurts the other.6 
                                                 
3 Federation of American Scientists, “The Football,” http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/nuclear-
football.htm [Accessed June 12, 2006]. Football is a secure briefcase that contains the information needed 
to enable the president to authorize and initiate a weapons strike. 
4 Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1992), 12.  
5 Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security 17, 
no. 3 (Winter, 1992-93): 164. 
6 Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 20.  
3 
The second dilemma involved with nuclear operations is regarding the civil-
military relations over the patterns associated with the control of nuclear weapons. The 
civilian control is dominated by two general approaches: delegative and assertive civilian 
control; and in both forms the military is subordinate to civilians, but the two have 
dramatically different conceptions of the role to be played by civilian leaders.7 The 
choice of choosing a particular approach, delegative or assertive control, depends on the 
civil-military relations a country enjoys. The pattern of civil-military relations most 
nearly approximates delegative control when a strict division of labor is observed and it 
approximates assertive control when the traditional division of labor is violated by 
civilian interference in nuclear operations.8  
Apart from the dilemmas mentioned above, Peter Feaver asserts that 
organizational and technological factors constitute fundamental constraints at work in the 
control of nuclear operations, and the five primary factors which, according to him, 
complicate the problem of civilian control are: 
• Normal Accidents. No matter how effective conventional safety devices 
are, there is a form of accident that is inevitable as accidents are expected 
in complex organizations dealing with high-risk technologies due to 
interactive complexity and tightly coupled nature of the system of 
control.9 
• The Politics of Artifacts. The technological artifacts, particularly those 
designed to resolve a specific policy problem, have long-lasting political 
influence, for example Permissive Action Links (PALs) where on the one 
hand they make tight centralized control; on the other hand they may lull 
political leadership into accepting deployments. 
• Balloon Effect. As squeezing a balloon displaces but does not reduce the 
air contained in the balloon, similarly civilian assertion in one area is 
likely to squeeze military autonomy into different areas, but it will not 
necessarily reduce overall military autonomy. 
• The Paradox of Control. Efforts at control often produce subordinate 
behavior that deviates to a greater extent from desired behavior than might 
have been the case in the absence of such efforts. 
                                                 
7 Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 7.  
8 Ibid., 10-11.  
9 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 
1984), 3-4. 
4 
• The Inevitability of Unwritten Rules and “Work-Arounds”. No written 
procedures, however well crafted,10 can anticipate every circumstance 
under which the system must operate. 
 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
India encountered the nuclear weapons command and control dilemma as a 
consequence of the 1998 nuclear tests by New Delhi. All the dilemmas and constraints 
mentioned earlier are applicable to New Delhi’s quest for restructuring India’s nuclear 
command and control system. As a responsible nuclear state, India took the first 
significant step toward establishment of a nuclear command and control system by 
promulgating a draft nuclear doctrine,11 on August 17, 1999 and releasing it to the public 
for open debate. After a considerable debate on the policy issues, the Cabinet Committee 
on Security (CCS) accepted the draft nuclear doctrine and announced the establishment 
of the Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister and the Executive Council chaired 
by the National Security Advisor.12 The broad guidelines regarding development, 
deployment and employment of Indian nuclear forces are stipulated in the draft nuclear 
doctrine and there is an ongoing debate about the possible paths which India should adopt 
in fulfilling these guidelines. India has not made any official statement regarding the 
status and implementation of the draft nuclear doctrine except that it has been accepted 
by the CCS on January 4, 2003. In this regard it is presumed that Indian government is 
maintaining a fine balance between transparency and opacity. The government also needs 
to consider that a degree of opacity strengthens the deterrent, but the complete lack of 
transparency could lead to serious misperceptions and miscalculation.13                    .  
                                                 
10 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 
1984), 22-26.  
11 Embassy of India, “Draft report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” 
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html [Accessed April 23, 
2006]. 
12 Government of India Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress 
in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” (Press Releases, Prime Minister’s Office, Jan 4, 2003),  
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html [Accessed May 23, 2006]. 
13 P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in 
South Asia,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001, 
http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMChari.pdf [Accessed June 12, 2006]. 
5 
Another important aspect is that the small number of Indian nuclear weapons does 
not imply that the corresponding command and control structure would be simple. It 
would require the same infrastructure, capabilities and operating concepts as countries 
possessing larger numbers of nuclear weapons, but on a smaller scale, and of course a lot 
depends on the selected Indian nuclear posture. The small number of weapons is easy to 
control, but then they are vulnerable with respect to survivability and hence the issue of 
command and control becomes more complex. The No-First-Use (NFU) policy 
mentioned in the Indian nuclear doctrine states that the nuclear weapons will only be used 
in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on Indian forces anywhere. 
The No-First-Use policy by India may make the command and control of nuclear 
weapons look simpler, affordable and easier to implement. But the No-First-Use policy 
has to be looked at through the prism of peacetime, crisis and wartime situations. The 
military crises with nuclear-armed Pakistan have been a regular feature in the Indian 
subcontinent in the past two decades. Managing these military crises in order to avoid 
nuclear brinkmanship, which could lead to a catastrophic disaster, is absolutely essential 
in South Asia. The swift handover or the smooth transition from peacetime to crisis and, 
if required, to a wartime situation would require a robust command and control system.  
To add to the complexities of Indian nuclear command and control, New Delhi 
needs to allow for two of its nuclear armed neighbors, China and Pakistan. Unlike the 
Cold War of the superpowers where they were pitted against each other, the Asian Cold 
War is arguably based on Kautilaya’s principle of “enemy’s enemy is a friend”. The 
development of an Indian nuclear command and control system should allow for an 
advanced nuclear and ballistic missile capable China, and at the same time should not 
inject unnecessary fear in a lesser capable Pakistan. Given the situation in South Asia, a 
triangular or bilateral treaty obligation involving China, India and Pakistan would be very 
difficult to negotiate since neither equality nor formalized inequality is likely to be 
acceptable to one or more parties.14 Therefore a multilateral treaty involving China, India 
and Pakistan on No-First-Use seems impossible. India is a peace-loving nation and has 
                                                 
14 Micheal Krepon, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Is Cold War Experience Applicable to South Asia?” The 
Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMKrepon.pdf [Accessed 
July 5, 2006]. 
6 
always renounced nuclear weapons but, owing to its precarious security problems, it was 
forced to develop nuclear weapons. The solution to its strategic security predicament lies 
in the nuclear command and control system. The NFU is unlikely to be dropped by New 
Delhi and therefore the Indian command and control system needs to balance between 
credible deterrence and moralistic NFU. Apart from the political and organizational 
challenges, India faces the technical and financial challenges as well towards developing, 
deploying and maintaining a robust command and control system.  
 
C. SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
The thesis examines two sets of literature that are relevant to the understanding of 
command and control of nuclear weapons in India. The first set of literature will be India-
specific, where the various issues of command and control of nuclear weapons will be 
considered and examined. The second body of literature is used to study the command 
and control of nuclear weapons of the United States. 
 The Indian nuclear doctrine, strategy, force posture and command and control of 
nuclear weapons have been reviewed by many well-known Indian and international 
scholars. The key issues with regards to the Indian nuclear doctrine as summarized by 
Dinesh Mannan are the viability of No-First-Use in the Indian context, the credibility of 
deterrence, survivability concerns after first strike, lack of C4I2 infrastructure and the 
safety and security apprehensions of nuclear assets.15 In addition, it is debated that the 
force posture demonstrated is not commensurate with the threat perceived as India still 
does not possess the strike capability to target the entire Chinese territory. A nuclear 
submarine capable of launching SLBMs would enhance India’s strike capability but is 
still in the developmental stage.16 In the field of C4I2 systems and the space-based assets 
which have been envisaged in the nuclear doctrine to provide early warning, 
communication and damage assessment, much still needs to be done to accomplish a 
                                                 
15 Dinesh Mannan, “A study of the Indian National Command Authority,” Bharat Rakshak Monitor 
6(2), (September – October 2003), http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-2/dinesh.html  
[Accessed 15 March 06].  
16 GlobalSecurity.org, “Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV),” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/atv.htm [Accessed April 15, 2006]. 
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foolproof command and control system, though India has made certain progress in this 
direction.  
The most notable books debating the various facets of command and control of 
the nuclear arsenal in India are Nuclear Defense, Shaping the Arsenal by Colonel 
Gurmeet Kanwal,17 and A Nuclear Strategy for India by RADM Raja Menon.18 Kanwal’s 
book gives a detailed account of a full scale critical analysis of the nuclear force structure 
that India should build for a credible nuclear deterrence. As a military officer, he provides 
insight into nuclear strategy, targeting philosophy, force structure and command and 
control. He argues that the No-First-Use is a major debate in India, and according to him 
this policy is a well-thought option for stability in South Asia. He looks at the important 
aspects of command and control of other nuclear weapon states and recommends a 
nuclear command and control structure for India whilst abiding by the No-First-Use and 
minimum credible deterrent policies. Menon’s book outlines deterrence theory, which is 
an important function in determining the command and control structure. In the later part 
of the book the author provides a workable model for planning a force and for organizing 
a nuclear command and control system. The author throws light on establishment of 
DEFCONs (defense conditions), availability of early warning systems, robust 
communication systems and a seamless chain of command for an effective command and 
control of nuclear weapons. 
India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture by Ashley J. Tellis deals with the emerging 
nuclear posture of India, her strategic interests and security goals. The technical details of 
the nuclear arsenal have been voluminously covered in two chapters named “Toward a 
Force-in being”. These three books cover all the important aspects of command and 
control of nuclear weapons in India and they will provide the necessary foundation for 
the existing command and control organization of nuclear weapons in India. 
                                                 
17 Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defense, Shaping the Arsenal (New Delhi: The Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analysis, 2001), 143-169. 
18 Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: United Services Institution of India, 2000), 
235-283. 
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The literature for the comparative study of command and control of nuclear 
weapons by the United States will provide the essential prerequisites for managing a 
nuclear operation.  
 Managing Nuclear Operations, by A. B. Carter, J. D. Steinbruner and C.A. 
Zraket, gives a detailed account of managing nuclear operations by the United States 
during peacetime and crisis, the command system required to conduct these operations, 
and dwells upon management issues.19 For the command system the book examines the 
communication needs of strategic nuclear forces, the warning and assessment sensors, the 
command center functions and the delegation of nuclear command authority.  
C3 Nuclear Command Control and Cooperation, by Valery E Yarynich discusses 
the command and control systems of Russia and the U.S. in great depth and provides 
comparative analysis of command and control structures and the procedures followed by 
these two countries. 
Strategic Command and Control, Redefining the Nuclear Threat, by Bruce G 
Blair, explains the central issue with nuclear weapons is command and control. It 
provides an account of the U.S. nuclear control system as it has evolved over the years.20 
The vulnerability of command, control and communication is an important issue, and he 
argues that lack of a robust system in the United States could invite a pre-emptive Soviet 
strike and also degrade an effective retaliatory strike.  
The book, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in 
United States, by Peter D. Feaver examines the evolution of U.S. policy on the custody of 
nuclear weapons with respect to physical and legitimate control. It provides a detailed 




                                                 
19 Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 17-425. 
20 Blair, Strategic Command, 1-303. 
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D. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
The management of nuclear weapons is laid on always/never guidelines and this 
balancing act is indispensable knowing the enormous destructive power of nuclear 
weapons. Therefore it is essential for a responsible nuclear state like India to strive for a 
perfect always/never nuclear posture depending on the threat perceived. The strategic 
stability in the region is crucial as India borders two other nuclear weapon states that 
have fought conventional wars with India in the past.  Another important concern 
involving nuclear weapons is the maintenance of the highest standards of safety and 
security of the arsenal, which can only be made possible with an infallible command and 
control system. Adherence to these requirements mentioned above is absolutely essential, 
and the nuclear strategists in India are engaged in solving the puzzle of development, 
deployment and employment of the nuclear forces. 
The purpose of this thesis is to design a robust command and control system for 
India which demonstrates credible deterrence, and is essentially based on the Indian 
pledge of NFU. It will do so by analyzing the requirements of Indian nuclear strategy, 
studying the U.S. nuclear command and control system as a model and, based on the 
model, deduce certain essential elements required to construct an Indian nuclear 
command and control system whilst adhering to the draft nuclear doctrine of India. 
The thesis does not dwell upon nuclear targeting which, though is a constituent of 
nuclear operation, is beyond the purview of this study. It is also beyond the scope of this 
thesis to analyze the number of nuclear weapons required to maintain the strategic 
balance. It is assumed that adequate measures would be taken and a sufficient number of 
nuclear weapons will be available for retaliation. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
The thesis first introduces the topic and the background of the problem. It then 
dwells upon the Indian nuclear policies and strategies as enumerated in the Indian nuclear 
doctrine. It discusses the threat perceived and the command and control structure in place 
to manage and operate these weapons of mass destruction. On completion of this 
examination of threat perception, force posture and command and control structure, the 
thesis points out shortcomings and limitations in these areas. The later part of the thesis 
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investigates the command and control set up of the United States in managing their 
nuclear arsenal. It is opined that through the comprehensive study of the model, 
necessary information would be gathered about the prerequisites of a nuclear operation. 
Based on this information, an Indian nuclear command and control system would be 
structured to meet the challenging demands of the draft nuclear doctrine. It concludes 
with a summary of findings and a roadmap for a robust Indian nuclear command and 
control system.  Figure 1 shows the outline of the thesis. 
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II. INDIAN NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. 
It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It 
is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers…We do not 
intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against 
any country; these are weapons for self-defense, to ensure that India is not 
subject to nuclear threats or coercion.21 
Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
India became a nuclear weapon state after testing five nuclear devices during May 
11-13, 1998, in the Pokhran range. The self-imposed restraint by India for 24 years, after 
having first demonstrated nuclear capability in 1974, is unique in the world and displays 
India’s constant abhorrence to nuclear weapons. The rationale behind the test can be 
ascertained from the letter by Vajpayee to President Bill Clinton following India’s 
nuclear tests in May 1998. Vajpayee wrote: 
I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, 
specially the nuclear environment faced by India for some years past. We 
have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which 
committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations 
with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of 
distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to 
the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to 
become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter 
neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years.22 
The development of nuclear weapons in India has taken decades and involved 
many governments. The bomb has many fathers: Congress conceived it, the United Front 
nurtured it, and the BJP delivered it.23 But the non-weaponized nuclear deterrent posture 
adopted by India during the 80s and 90s did not ask for promulgation of nuclear doctrine. 
                                                 
21 “Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the Indian Parliament on May 27, 
1998,” India News, May 16-June 15, 1998, 1. 
22 “India’s Letter to Clinton on Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, May 13, 1998. 
23 A. S. Prakash, “All Were Party to the Nuclear Gatecrash,” The Pioneer (Chandigarh), May 25, 
1998. 
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Consequently, after the 1998 tests, the BJP government released Draft Nuclear Doctrine 
(DND) which posits the nuclear policies and posture of India and lays the guidelines for 
nuclear command and control in India. 
This chapter will shed light on the DND and existing nuclear command and 
control system in India. It will look into the threat perceived by India and the force 
posture maintained to mitigate this threat. Later, it will dwell upon the limitations of the 
existing command and control system in India. 
B. INDIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
The draft Indian nuclear doctrine and command and control of nuclear weapons 
were first documented by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on August 17, 
1999.24 Subsequently, the Cabinet committee on Security on January 4, 2003, 
summarized,25 the salient features of the draft doctrine as follows: 
• Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent. 
• Policy of “No First Use” (NFU): nuclear weapons will only be used in 
retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on Indian forces 
anywhere. 
• Nuclear retaliation to a first strike by the opponent will be massive and 
designed to inflict unacceptable damage. 
• Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the civilian political 
leadership through the NCA. 
• Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. 
• In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by 
biological or chemical weapons, India retains the option of retaliating with 
nuclear weapons. 
• A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related 
materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on 
nuclear tests. 
• Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, 
through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. 
                                                 
24 Arms Control Association, “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99.asp [Accessed December 20, 2005]. 
25 Prime Minister’s Office Press Releases, “Cabinet Committee on security Reviews Progress in 
Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” 
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html [Accessed May 31, 2006]. 
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C. THREAT PERCEPTION 
The threat perception is an important ingredient in determining the command and 
control system. The threat perceived by the United States during the Cold War ensured a 
massive expansion of nuclear weapons and the introduction of an elaborate and complex 
command and control system to support nuclear operations. India has two nuclear armed 
neighbors, China and Pakistan, with whom it has fought conventional wars in the past. 
The Chinese and Pakistani threats in the 1980s and 1990s may have crystallized into 
demonstration of nuclear tests by New Delhi. India and the world are well aware of the 
non-proliferation set-back in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of clandestine assistance by 
China in the nuclear program of Pakistan, and this nexus continues to be a menace to 
India. India therefore finds itself in a precarious situation where it is threatened by two 
nuclear armed states which have common strategic interests. During the Cold War, 
because of the two main players, there was a kind of strategic stability; but in a triangular 
affair between India, China and Pakistan the strategic instability is bound to creep in. The 
nuclear doctrine, policy and posture of India then essentially depend upon the relations of 
India with China and Pakistan. 
1. China 
China is a regional Asian power which dominates the region economically and 
militarily and aspires to dominate world affairs in the near future. China has taken giant 
steps on both the economic and military fronts in the recent past. The technological 
advancements and sustained two figure growth in GDP has provided the necessary 
impetus for defense modernization in China. China is an expansionist and ambitious 
country which will try to suppress any other country which it sees as a potential 
challenger to its aspirations. China views India as a potential challenger to its economy 
and military and will do everything on its part to contain India. This is being carried out 
by continuously claiming Indian Territory without any rational foundation and assisting 
Pakistan in improving its nuclear and missile capabilities to counterbalance India’s 
military power. In addition to occupying large tracts of Indian Territory, China rejects 
Indian sovereignty over Sikkim, and lays claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh up to 
14 
the Brahmaputra River in the Assam plains.26 On the other hand, China has peacefully 
resolved almost all other border disputes with its other neighboring countries (except 
India), having concluded treaties that limit 20,222 Km of its boundaries.27 This is 
because of the economic interests of China in its neighboring countries, other than India, 
weighs more as these countries do not pose a challenge to Chinese military power. 
Whereas in the Indian context, the Chinese want to prolong the border issues and 
constantly engage the Indian militarily. This is despite the fact that India wants to resolve 
all outstanding issues with China peacefully. During his visit to China in June 2003, 
Vajpayee reiterated its recognition of Tibet as part of China and promised not to support 
separatist activities by Tibetan exiles in India.28 Any border dispute with China could 
lead to a nuclear war and it may be one of the reasons of massive deployment of Chinese 
nuclear armed missiles around borders adjoining India. 
The relations with India, with whom China enjoyed excellent rapport with Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence after India’s 
independence, were marred by the Chinese invasion in 1962. It carved an irreconcilable 
security concern on the Indian psyche and was corroborated by the Chinese nuclear tests 
in 1964. Over a period of three decades between 1964 and 1996, China conducted 45 
nuclear tests, of which 23 were atmospheric.29 China continues to modernize its nuclear 
arsenal. China has declared the NFU policy, but this policy has been challenged by many 
analysts. According to Vijai K. Nair, China’s nuclear doctrine includes the use of nuclear 
weapons to settle territorial disputes and its ‘no-first-use’ strategy is directed only toward 
non-nuclear weapon states, a group from which India was excluded well before May 
1998.30 
                                                 
26 Vijai K. Nair, “No More Ambiguity: India’s Nuclear Policy,” Foreign Service Journal (October 
2002): 51. 
27 Fu Ying, “China and Asia in the New Period,” Foreign Affairs Journal, no. 69 (September 2003): 1. 
28 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia, Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 
29, no.3 (Winter 2004-05): 82. 
29 “India’s Statement on Chinese Reaction to Nuclear Tests,” India News, May 16-June 15, 1998, 6. 
30 Nair, “No More Ambiguity,” 51. 
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The Chinese nuclear arsenal is nowhere close to that of the United States and 
Russia, two potential adversaries; however, China has resources and technological 
capabilities to enhance their nuclear program. But the Chinese have not expanded their 
nuclear capabilities to either match the United States or Russia; instead they have kept a 
low profile by promulgating NFU policy. There could be many reasons for maintaining a 
low profile. First, the Chinese strategic security does not warrant an offensive nuclear 
policy but certainly an offensive nuclear posture is maintained in the form of deployed 
nuclear and conventional missiles. Second, their nuclear weapons expansion program will 
unnecessarily create panic in the region, especially for Japan who might have to rethink 
its strategic security. Third, with a low profile, China is buying the necessary time to 
modernize its missiles, nuclear weapons capabilities and space technologies. The Chinese 
nuclear and missile technology proliferation to Pakistan is a nuisance to India. With the 
proliferation, and later Pakistan having demonstrated nuclear and missile capabilities, 
there seems to be lull in military ties between these two countries, though economic 
cooperation between China and Pakistan has increased tremendously. The lull in military 
ties can be attributed to the fact that China has accomplished its goal of balancing India 
and such clandestine assistance is a setback to the proliferation regime which disrupts the 
Chinese image as a responsible nuclear state. However it is most likely that China will 
again resort to clandestine transfer of technology to Pakistan once India attains the 
capability of operating SLBMs on nuclear submarines. This way, by clandestinely 
helping Pakistan, China has found an easy but harmful and dangerous solution to India’s 
growing military and economic power in the region. India, being a responsible nuclear 
state, would not have visualized about a stalemate by sharing its nuclear and missile 
technology with Japan. But it would be in the interests of India to at least share the 
common strategic concerns with Japan. 
a. China’s Nuclear Arsenal 
The Chinese strategic posture has been less transparent when compared to 
the West. China has never disclosed the size and disposition of its nuclear forces, though 
it is estimated that it is third in terms of quantity of nuclear weapons after the United 
States and Russia. According to an estimate, in 2006 China deploys approximately 130 
nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and bombers 
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and additional warheads to be in storage, for a total stockpile of approximately 200 
warheads.31 The estimates of the Chinese nuclear warheads by the same authors in 2003 
were 400.32 These estimates indicate that there is a decline in the number of Chinese 
warheads. The basis for the decline in estimates has not been declared as all these 
estimates are based on current intelligence inputs. 
The modernization of the nuclear arsenal in China is underway. China 
conducted a series of nuclear tests in the 1980s and 1990s. Although China officially 
declared in 1994 that these tests were for improving safety features on existing warheads, 
these tests were also likely intended for the development of new, smaller warheads for 
China's next-generation solid-fuel ICBMs DF-31 and DF-41 and also possibly to develop 
a Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability.33  
b. China’s Nuclear Delivery Systems 
China maintains the nuclear weapon delivery capabilities of a triad (i.e., 
land based missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and bombers). Like the 
Russians, the Chinese have the land based missiles as their strongest leg. The current 
nuclear delivery systems and the future inductions with their Initial Operating 
Capabilities (IOC) are mentioned below: 
• The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery is fielding mobile, 
more survivable missiles capable of targeting the United States, Japan, 
India, Russia, and other targets in Asia and the rest of the world. It 
currently deploys approximately 20 silo-based, liquid-fueled CSS-4 
ICBMs, which constitute its primary nuclear means of holding continental 
U.S. targets at risk. In addition, it maintains approximately 20 liquid-
fueled, limited range CSS-3 ICBMs that enable it to attack targets in Asia 
region. China’s “theater” nuclear force is made up of the CSS-2 IRBMs 
and solid propellant, road-mobile CSS-5 MRBMs. 
• By 2010, China’s strategic nuclear forces will likely comprise a 
combination of enhanced silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs; CSS-3 ICBMs; CSS-5 
MRBMs; soild-fuled, road mobile DF-31 (IOC in 2006) and DF-31A 
                                                 
31 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristesen, “NRDC: Nuclear Notebook Chinese Nuclear forces, 
2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no.3 (May-June 2006): 60-63. 
32 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristesen, “NRDC: Nuclear Notebook Chinese Nuclear forces, 
2003,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no.6 (November-December 2003): 77-80. 
33  NTI, “China’s Nuclear Weapon Development, Modernization and Testing,” 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/wnwmdat.htm [Accessed July 20, 2006]. 
17 
ICBMs (IOC 2007); and sea-based JL-1 and JL-2s SLBMs (IOC 2007-
10). The JL-2 SLBMs will be deployed onboard the JIN-class (Type 094) 
SSBN.34 
The Chinese arsenal along with their delivery systems is shown in Table 1. 
In view of the inaccuracies in the estimates of the Chinese nuclear forces, Table 1 has 
been compiled from three resources in order to narrow down the inaccuracies. 
 








Land-based Missiles         
DF-3A CSS-2 IRBM 14-18 1971 2790+ 1 x 3300 
DF-4 CSS-3 ICBM 20-24 1980 5470+ 1 x 3300 
DF-5A CSS-4 ICBM 20 1981 13000+ 1 x 4000-5000
DF-21,21A 
CSS-5 Mod 1/2 
MRBM 19-50 1991 1770+ 1 x 200-300 
DF-15/M-9 CSS-6 SRBM 275-315 ? 600 1 x 50-350 
DF-11/M11 CSS-7 SRBM 435-475 ? 300 1 x 350 
DF 31 CSS-X-17 0 
Under 
Development 8000+ 1 x? 
DF 31A ? 0 
Under 
Development 12000+ 1 x? 
Sea- based Missiles           
JL-1 CSS-NX-3 SLBM 12 1986 1770+ 1x 200-300 
JL-2 CSS-NX-4 SLBM 0 
Under 
Development 8000+ 1 X? 
Nuclear capable Aircraft         
Hong-6 B-6 120 1965 3100 1-3 X 10-3000
Qian-5 etc A-5A ? 1970 400 1 X 10-3000 
 
Table 1. Chinese Nuclear Arsenal and Delivery Platforms35 
 
 
                                                 
34 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006,” 
Annual Report to Congress, 26-27. 
35 Compiled from Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power,”; Norris and Kristesen, 
“NRDC,”; and Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Capabilities,” China Profile,  
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/5569_5636.html [Accessed on May 21, 2006]. 
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Additional information on the Chinese nuclear forces is mentioned below: 
• JL-1 has never been fully operational. It is the sea-based variant of DF 
21/21A. JL-2 is a variant of DF-31 missiles. 
• China’s Second Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM 
brigades; another brigade is deployed with the PLA ground forces 
garrisoned in Nanjing military region. 
• Tactical warheads (possibly including artillery shells, rockets, Atomic 
Demolition Munitions (ADMs) which have low Kilo Ton yield amount to 
70 warheads. 
• Standard abbreviations: 
• DF- Dong Feng (East Wind). 
• JL- Julang (Giant Wave). 
• CSS- Chinese Surface to Surface. 
• CSS-N- Chinese Surface to Surface Naval. 
• CSS-T- Chinese Surface to Surface Tactica.l36 
2. Pakistan 
India and Pakistan have had unstable relations since their independence in 1947. 
Since then the two countries have fought three wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and one 
limited war in 1999 (Kargil conflict). The Kargil conflict was fought after the two 
countries had demonstrated their nuclear capabilities in May 1998. The overt nuclear 
capability of Pakistan did not provide it to overcome the unnecessary paranoia of the 
Indian military. New Delhi hoped that Pakistan would no longer be concerned with the 
strategic asymmetry that had long prevailed in India’s favor.37 Instead the Kargil conflict 
in 1999 proved that Indian assumptions were misplaced. The conclusion drawn in New 
Delhi from the Kargil experience was that, instead of seeking a stable relationship on the 
basis of nuclear weapons capabilities, Pakistan used nuclear deterrence to support 
aggression.38   
                                                 
36 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power,”; Norris and Kristesen, “NRDC,”; and Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Capabilities,” China Profile,  
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/5569_5636.html [Accessed on May 21, 2006]. 
37 V. R. Raghvan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review 
(Fall-Winter 2001):2. 
38 Raghvan, “Limited War.” 
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Pakistani leaders undertook the Kargil operation based in part upon their belief 
that Pakistan enjoyed a local tactical advantage over India, and that Pakistan would 
receive international support for its position in the confrontation.39 The Kargil conflict 
has forced the Indian strategists to rethink their war doctrine. The Indian caution [during 
the Kargil conflict] resulted at least in part from concern over the possibility of a 
Pakistani nuclear response.40 In order to refrain from carrying out another Kargil-like 
adventure, the Indian strategists have carved out the strategy of “limited war” with 
Pakistan. Former Indian Army Chief of Staff General V P Malik states that, “if Pakistan 
could do Kargil [without escalation to the strategic level], India could do something 
similar in response to the continued Pakistani’s provocation in Kashmir without fear of a 
nuclear confrontation.”41   
General Khalid Kidwai of Strategic Plans Division (SPD) asserts that “nuclear 
weapons are aimed solely at India and in case the deterrence fails, they will be used if: 
• India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space 
threshold). 
• India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military 
threshold). 
• India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic 
strangling). 
• India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large 
subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization).”42 
Kashmir remains an issue between India and Pakistan. A large tract of land in 
Kashmir has been illegally occupied by Pakistan despite the whole territory of Jammu 
and Kashmir being an integral part of India after the maharaja of Kashmir signed an 
instrument of accession and joined India in 1947. In a secular democracy, the legal 
                                                 
39 S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold 
War Europe,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005):144. 
40  P. R. Chari, P.I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: 
The Compound Crisis of 1990 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 143. 
41 Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace,” 148. 
42 Lanau Network- Centro Volta, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in 
Pakistan,” 
http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf#search=%22nuclear%20safety%2C%20nuclear%20stabilit
y%20and%20nuclear%20strategy%22 [Accessed on July 18, 2006]. 
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aspects are more significant and binding than the rational thinking of self-determination. 
It can be argued that the legal accession of California and parts of Texas with the United 
States has prevented Mexico from claiming these territories though they were part of 
Mexico before their accession. But Pakistan fails to recognize the legal accession of 
Kashmir with India. The support for terrorists and the eventual “liberation” of Indian 
Kashmir is a central national project,43 and the Kashmir dispute, in the Pakistani 
government’s view, constitutes the “core issue” in Indo-Pakistani relations.44 But is 
Kashmir the “core issue” between India and Pakistan? The answer is no. Pakistan is a 
nation which is born insecure and the question raised by the prosperity of Muslims who 
remained in a democratic and secular India vis-à-vis the Muslims in Pakistan always 
haunts the political leaders of Pakistan and questions its very existence. The same 
political leaders, when they are out of power, would criticize the foreign policies of 
Pakistan and would suggest peaceful solutions to all the disputes with India. A recent 
statement by former Prime Minster Nawaz Sharrif and Benazir Bhutto declared that 
“peaceful relations with India and Afghanistan will be pursued without prejudice to 
outstanding disputes.”45 The Kashmir issue is a political gambit which the civilian 
leaders in Pakistan play according to their advantage. Pakistan’s military on the other 
hand wants to solve the Kashmir issue by destabilizing the region through ISI activities 
and of late wants to solve the problem by force, as is evident in the Kargil conflict 
thereby settling all the scores with the Indian military about their previous defeats. To de-
stabilize the communal harmony in India, Pakistan based terrorists have spread their 
operations to other parts of India and are not limited to Kashmir. In accordance with 
General Kidwai’s nuclear strategy of Pakistan regarding nuclear strike for domestic 
destabilization of Pakistan by India: if India, follows the same strategy, it should have 
nuked Pakistan long ago for carrying out domestic destabilization in India through its 
                                                 
43 BBC News, “Excerpts from Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2011509.stm [Accessed 
June 12, 2006]. 
44 People’s Daily, “Kashmir Remains Core Issue Between India, Pakistan: Pakistani PM,” 
http://english.people.com.cn/200403/17/eng20040317_137708.shtml [Accessed July 18, 2006]. 
45 Hasan Surror, “Nawaz Sharif Sign, Charter of Democracy,” The Hindu, May 16, 2006. 
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terrorist network. The major attacks outside Kashmir during 2001-2006 are placed at 
Table 2. 
Place Date Causalities 
Indian Parliament, New Delhi 13 Dec 2001 09 killed 
American Cultural Center, Kolkata 22 Jan 2002 04 killed and 21 injured 
Twin Blasts, Mumbai 25 Aug 2005 46 killed and over 160 injured 
Akshardham Temple, Gandhinagar 24 Sep 2002 29 killed and 74 injured 
Makeshift Ram temple, Ayodhya 05 Jul 05 1 killed and 3 injured 
Jaunpur Train Explosion, Uttar Pradesh 29 Jul 2005 10 killed and 50 injured 
Marketplaces, New Delhi 29 Oct 2005 70 killed several injured 
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 28 Dec 2005 1 killed and 05 injured 
Sankat Mochan Temple, Varanasi 07 Mar 2006 100 injured 
RSS Headquarters, Nagpur 1 Jun 2006 None 
Mumbai Train blasts 11 Jul 2006 190 killed and 625 injured 
 
Table 2. Major Terrorist Attacks in India Outside Kashmir (2002-2006)46 
Growing terrorist’s activities around India from Pakistan based terrorist camps is 
a big concern for Indian policymakers. The mounting suffering and anguish amongst the 
Indian people could lead to a possible limited war between Indian and Pakistan. During 
the 2001-02 military stand-off between India and Pakistan, a limited war was threatened 
but was never fought. The initial threats from India were complied by Pakistan by 
banning the terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, and 
President Pervez Musharraf publicly promised not to allow Pakistani territory to be used 
as a launching ground for terrorism in Kashmir.47 Kargil has proved that the 
stability/instability paradox prevails in South Asia and a limited war can be fought. The 
chances of a limited war erupting into a nuclear confrontation cannot be ruled out, but 
                                                 
46 Samrat Sinha, “Major Terrorist attacks in India (2000-2006),” IPCS, http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-
Special-Report-27.pdf [Accessed July 31, 2006]. 
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Pakistan would have to pay a heavy price if it escalates one against India. As former 
defense Minister George Fernandes puts it, after an initial Pakistani nuclear strike on 
India, “we may have lost a part of our population,” but after India’s retaliatory strike on 
Pakistan, “Pakistan may have been completely wiped out.”48 
a. Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal 
Pakistan has been trying to acquire nuclear bombs since the 1970s. After 
the Indo-Pak war in 1965, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto asserted 
in 1965 that “if India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but 
we will get one of our own.”49 But the necessary impetus to the Pakistani nuclear 
program was given by Bhutto after the defeat in the 1971 war with India. The Pakistani 
nuclear program has been shrouded by illegal smuggling and through clandestine 
assistance by other countries. The illegal activities were carried out by the key player in 
Pakistani’s enrichment capability, Dr. Abdul Quadeer Khan. He returned to Pakistan in 
1975 with knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he acquired at the classified 
URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands and also stole uranium 
enrichment technologies from Europe.50 Another factor in the development of nuclear 
weapons in Pakistan has been the “Chinese connection.” China is known to have 
provided a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan along with sufficient weapon-
grade uranium for two tests, established a special industrial furnace at the Khushab 
facility to produce plutonium, transferred enough tritium gas for triggers for ten nuclear 
weapons, trained Pakistani technicians, and guided Pakistani scientists in propellant and 
warhead technologies.51 
The Pakistani’s nuclear weapons are primarily based on Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) although the production of weapon grade plutonium is carried out on a 
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49 John F. Burns, “Nuclear Anxiety: The Overview, Pakistan Answering India, Carries Out Nuclear 
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50 Federation of American Scientists, “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, A Brief History of Pakistan’s 
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smaller scale at the Khushab nuclear reactor. The estimates of nuclear arsenal in 
Pakistan’s inventory are mentioned below: 
• It is assumed that Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment plant is able to produce 
between 80-140 Kilograms (Kgs) [median 110 Kgs] of weapon-grade 
uranium per year. The amount of HEU required for a bomb is believed to 
range between 12-25 Kgs [median 18 Kgs] depending on weapon 
design.52 
• The Khushab nuclear reactor is able to produce 1.7-13 Kgs [median 
approximately 8 Kgs] weapon grade plutonium per year.53 It is assumed 
that 5-7 Kgs [median 6 Kgs] of plutonium is required for one warhead.54 
• Recent media reports suggest that Pakistan’s Khushab nuclear site show 
what appears to be a partially completed heavy water reactor capable of 
producing enough plutonium for 40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year, which 
is a 20 fold increase from Pakistan’s current capabilities.55 
The production capabilities mentioned above are shrouded with 
uncertainties about the year in which these production levels were achieved. During the 
HEU moratorium from 1991 to 1998, the Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) produced till 
1998 and 1999 were upgraded in the enrichment plants to weapon-grade uranium.56 The 
Khushab research reactor that is capable of producing weapon-grade plutonium was 
made operational in April 1998.57 The summary of Pakistan’s fissile material and nuclear 
weapons inventories for HEU from 1991 and for weapon-grade plutonium from 1998 
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               Fissile Material            Nuclear Weapons 
  Low Medium High Low   Medium High 
Uranium 1200 1650 2100 48 92 175 
Plutonium 13.6 64 104 2 11 21 
Total       50 103 196 
 
Table 3. Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons (2006) 
 
 
b. Pakistan’s Nuclear Delivery Systems 
Pakistan’s nuclear delivery platforms are based on land-based ballistic 
missiles and bombers. The estimates and capabilities of Pakistan’s nuclear delivery 





Range (Km) Payload Source 
Land-based missiles         
Haft 1 18 1983 80 500 Indigenous 
Haft 2 (Abdali) 1 ? 180 500 Indigenous/China 
Haft 3 (Ghaznavi) ? 1995 290 ? Indigenous/China 
Haft 4 (Shaheen1 ) 20 ? 600 1000 Indigenous/China 
Haft 5 (Ghauri) 5-10 1998 1500 700 Indigenous/DPRK 
Haft 6 ( Shaheen 2) ? ? 2000-2500 1000-2500 Indigenous/China 
M-11 40   300   China 
Nuclear capable 
aircraft           
F- 16 A/B 32 1983 925 4500 United States 
Mirage 5 PA 50 ? 1300 ? France 
 
Table 4. Pakistan’s Nuclear Delivery Platforms58 
 
C. EXISTING NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE IN 
INDIA 
1. National Command Authority 
The information available on the National Command Authority (NCA) is as 
follows,59 and is depicted in the Figure 2: 
                                                 
58 Lavoy, “Managing,” 89, and CDI, “Nuclear Weapons Database: Pakistani Nuclear Delivery 
Systems,” http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/panukes.html [Accessed August 15, 2006]. 
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• NCA is a two-layered body comprising of Political Council chaired by 
Prime Minister and Executive Council chaired by National Security 
Advisor. The Prime Minister of India is the sole body to authorize the use 
of nuclear weapons. 
• The Executive Council provides inputs for decision-making by the 
Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the 
Political Council. 
• The Political Council comprises members of the Cabinet Committee on 
Security (CCS) and the National Security Advisor (NSA). The Executive 
Council includes the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), the 
three Service chiefs, heads of intelligence agencies, and the scientific 
organizations engaged in the nuclear program. 
• A tri-service command called the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) was 
created in January 2003 and the official press release on January 4, 2003 
described the role of SFC as to manage and administer all strategic Forces. 
• In the event that the Political Council orders a nuclear retaliatory strike, 
the Prime Minister can be expected to directly contact the SFC and not 
work through the agency of the Executive Council, which is depicted by 
the heavy bold arrow in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.   A Schematic Description of the Indian National Command Authority 60 
 
2. Command and Custody 
The command and control of Indian nuclear operations, which are based on No-
First-Use, can be divided into four operational tasks61 of command of the force, custody, 
integration, and delivery. It is opined that the Indian nuclear force is maintained in the 
                                                 
60 Rajen, “Nuclear Confidence-Building.” 
61 Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready 
Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 443. 
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form of separated components with the responsibilities for the command, custody, 
integration and use of the weapons distributed amongst the civilians and military as 
shown in Figure 3. The command and control structure of nuclear weapons in India is 
highly assertive with strict civilian control. The NFU policy of India places its nuclear 
weapons in a “de-mated” posture in peacetime which implies that the warheads are 
separated from the delivery vehicles, with scientists controlling the warheads and the 
armed forces manning the delivery vehicles. A nuclear warhead comprises the nuclear 
core and the trigger assembly and these two major parts are stored separately by the 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defense Research and Developmental 
Organization (DRDO) scientists respectively.62 The DAE has always been under the 
Prime Minister’s personal charge and the DRDO is under the Defense Minister. 
 
 
Figure 3.   India’s Assertive Command System-The “Baseline” Model 63   
3. Command and Control 
The military aspect of the command and control cycle of the nuclear weapons 
actually commence after the nuclear attack on India has taken place, and before that it can 
be assumed that only command and custody is in force. After the decision to retaliate has 
been determined with the inputs from NCA (see Figure 2) the Prime Minister of India 
will initiate the process of integration (see Figure 3) of the nuclear weapons. The process 
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of integration requires a high level of coordination amongst the DAE, DRDO and the 
military. Within the military the coordination is going to be amongst the Chairman Chief 
of Staff Committee (COSC), Chief of Integrated Defense Staff (CIDS) and the 
Commander-in Chief Strategic Force Command (C-in-C SFC). The COSC normally 
reports to the Defense Minister, but will report on nuclear matters to the NCA64 as 
depicted by the two sided arrows in Figure 4. It can be presumed that as a crisis escalates, 
under the authorization of the Political Council and with the involvement of the DRDO 
and DAE, the SFC will receive the fissile cores well before any final authorization for use 
by the Indian Prime Minister.65  
 
 
Figure 4.   Indian Nuclear Command and Control 
 
D. INDIAN NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE  
The force posture and organization maintained by India in order to mitigate the 
threat perceived from China and Pakistan would be covered by looking at the Indian 
nuclear arsenal and delivery platforms. 
                                                 
64 Rajen, “Nuclear Confidence-Building.”   
65 Ibid. 
Prime Minister 
Chairman AEC Defense Minister 
COSC 
C-in-C SFC CIDS 
Secretary DRDO 
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1. India’s Nuclear Arsenal 
India relies on plutonium for its weapons and 25-40 Kgs worth of bomb-grade 
plutonium is separated by Indian scientists every year.66 The nuclear fissile material 
stockpiles and weapon capabilities of India are shown in Table 5. 
               Fissile Material            Nuclear Weapons 
  Low Medium High Low   Medium High 
Uranium Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Plutonium 300 430 640 40 80 130 
Total       40 80 130 
 
Table 5. Indian Nuclear Arsenal66  
2. India’s Nuclear Delivery Platforms 
The nuclear forces of India, as outlined in the DND, will be based on a triad of 
aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea based assets. The present nuclear delivery 




Land-based missiles     
Prithvi 1 ? 150 Indigenous 
Prithvi 2 ? 250 Indigenous 
Prithvi 3 ? 350 Indigenous 
Agni1 ? 700-900 Indigenous 
Agni2 ? 2000-3000 Indigenous 
Agni3 ? 3500-4000 Indigenous 
Nuclear 
capable 
aircraft    
Mirage-
2000H 35 1205 France 
Su-30 MKI 18 3000 Russia 
Jaguar S(I) 88 850 UK/France 
Mig-27 
ML 214 500 Russia 
Table 6. India’s Nuclear Delivery Systems67 
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E. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
India has structured its nuclear command and control system in a unique way 
which is quite different from the ones existing in other nuclear states. There is no model 
available for India on which it can base its nuclear command and control system. The 
Indian nuclear command and control system is in its emerging state, and therefore some 
limitations are bound to exist in the system. The Cold War has demonstrated that a 
nuclear command and control system takes decades to mature into a stable system.  
1. Ambiguities in Minimum Credible Deterrence 
India’s nuclear policy is based on two important pillars of NFU and minimum 
credible deterrence. The NFU is a well thought out policy to balance two simultaneous 
threats in which one adversary has a superior nuclear force while the other has an inferior 
one. But the dimension of minimum credible deterrence can not be applied to both of 
them simultaneously. Rajesh M. Basrur, a noted strategist, asserts that the concept of 
minimum credible deterrence is not entirely clear. He writes, 
In essence, the Indian conception of minimum credible deterrence 
encompasses the understanding that it is not necessary to have large 
numbers of sophisticated weapons to deter nuclear adversaries; that 
nuclear “balances” are not meaningful; and that weapons need not be 
deployed and kept in a high state of readiness in order that deterrence be 
effective. Beyond this, important questions remain. While the 
development of capabilities in technology and organization proceeds 
apace, nobody is quite clear about what minimum deterrence means. How 
many weapons are adequate, and of what kind? Might deployment become 
necessary at some point of time, and if so, under what circumstances? Is 
war still possible, if so, how?68 
The NFU and the de-mated posture together do not demonstrate a minimum 
credible deterrence. India needs to clearly define the minimum credible deterrence so that 
appropriate nuclear posture can be evolved from it in order to deter India’s adversaries. 
2. Limited Role of Indian Armed Forces 
General Ved Prakash Malik, former Chief of the Army Staff, points out that the 
armed forces of India are kept out of the national security loop and were not adequately 
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consulted by the government on operational and strategic matters, and this can result in 
large communication gaps between what is politically desirable and what is being 
planned by the military.69  Figure 3 illustrates that the military’s involvement starts after 
the nuclear attack on India and terminates at the successful delivery of the nuclear 
weapons. It would be customary for the government of India to consult the C-in-C SFC 
or COSC for nuclear targeting and one of the primary inputs for targeting will be the 
number of nuclear warheads available. The military is not involved in the decision 
making process regarding the quantity of nuclear weapons required by the government of 
India in accomplishing its nuclear strategic policies. The decision regarding the number 
of nuclear warheads is exceptionally political and so it is believed that the military will be 
unaware of the number of nuclear warheads which India possess until the beginning of 
the mating of the nuclear weapons. The formulation of the targeting matrix at such a late 
stage after a nuclear attack on India could lead to the problems of “what is politically 
desirable and what is being planned by the military” as purported by General Malik. 
3. Absence of Successor 
Clause 5.1 of the draft nuclear doctrine states that the authority to release nuclear 
weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India or the designated 
successor(s). No official list has been promulgated so far and if transparency is shown by 
promulgating the list of successor(s) as is done in the case of the United States, then it 
will streamline the nuclear chain of command. 
4. Absence of Common Communication Backbone 
Communications are going to be the crux of the command and control system and 
a lot is dependent on them especially after absorbing a first strike. The NFU policy will 
ensure that nuclear weapons are widely dispersed and essentially mobile and they will be 
moving around at frequent intervals in order to evade the first strike by nuclear or 
conventional attack. The dispersion of the nuclear weapons therefore makes the 
requirement of reliable communications amongst these storage locations with the 
command authority a basic necessity. Since a war in general and a nuclear strike in 
particular is going to be a coordinated effort, communication among each component of 
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the Armed Forces along with Command Center needs no emphasis. The command, 
control and communication systems in the three services of our defense forces have 
developed independently without any meaningful efforts towards evolving a joint 
architecture for such systems, and there are no dedicated defense satellite systems.70 
 5. Limitations of C-in-C SFC as an Operational Commander 
The C-in-C SFC is responsible for the administration of all the nuclear forces of 
India. The open source literature reveals that C-in-C SFC does not hold any nuclear 
delivery systems. How and when he will have the custody of all the nuclear delivery 
platforms or will these be seconded to him during the crisis71 are some on the 
unanswered questions about the operational functioning of C-in-C SFC which needs to be 
clarified. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The credibility of nuclear deterrence by a deterrer is always a big question mark 
as it is impossible to gauge the psychological effect of it on the deterree under all 
circumstances. The nuclear policy, posture, and the effectiveness of the command and 
control of the nuclear weapons are the two main inputs for a credible deterrence. The two 
adversaries with differing nuclear postures and nuclear capabilities can not be scaled 
simultaneously under the “minimum credible deterrence” in conjunction with de-mated 
weapons. The overt demonstration of nuclear capabilities by India in May 1998 has 
demanded a requirement of a robust command and control system. The command and 
control of nuclear weapons during the de-mated state is relatively easy, but it will be 
difficult to manage during the fog of war. The C-in-C SFC should have a certain number 
of nuclear assets deployed under his operational command such that they can be used 
effectively in a retaliatory strike. A healthy civil-military relation on such an important 
issue as nuclear command and control is indisputable, and the integration of the military 
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into all decision-making processes relating to nuclear issues will only support the 
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III. NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES  
Communications are the nervous system of the entire SAC organization, 
and their protection is therefore, of the greatest importance. I like to say 
that without communications, all I control is my desk, and that is not a 
very lethal weapon.72 
General T. S. Power, CINCSAC, May 1959 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States was the first and only country to use nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
weapons were first invented by the United States, and the world discovered their 
destructive power when they were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With such enormous 
destructive potential, nuclear weapons remained a prized possession of the United States 
only for a few years as other states accelerated their nuclear programs. The Soviets were 
the first to break the monopoly of the United States and produced nuclear weapons in 
August 1949. Since then, there was a race between the United States and Soviets 
(presently Russia who is the inheritor of the Soviet’s entire nuclear arsenal) to outpace 
the other in the nuclear game. During the Cold War both the superpowers amassed a 
substantial number of nuclear weapons based on their policies of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD). Both countries established elaborate command and control 
infrastructure based on their Launch on Warning (LOW) posture. The command and 
control system established by the United States has evolved considerably over the last six 
decades to incorporate extensive positive control over the nuclear arsenal and at the same 
time strengthening the negative control by minimizing the risks of inadvertent, accidental 
or unauthorized firing. The efficient management of nuclear forces during peacetime has 
been mastered by the United States and adequate measures have been implemented in 
their command and control system for survivability in order to pose a credible deterrent 
against the aggressor.  
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In order to establish a credible deterrence, not only the destructive power of the 
nuclear weapons is taken into account but also the complex organization looking after 
their command and control. The establishment of a robust nuclear command and control 
system by the United States established a stronger strategic stability with the Soviet 
Union and was one of the most influential moves towards avoiding a nuclear war. It is 
worthwhile to study the command and control of the United States in order to determine 
the essential requisites regarding procedures, components and the interaction involved at 
various political and military levels for their nuclear operations. This comparative study 
later assists in formulating a tailor-made command and control system for Indian nuclear 
forces. 
The study of the U.S. command and control system includes: the evolution of 
their doctrine, the key players in decision-making, command centers including alternate 
arrangements for controlling nuclear operations, nuclear command and control cycle, the 
infrastructure and role of early warning systems, communications network, the technical 
and organizational procedures involved for establishment of efficient civilian control and 
measures taken to overcome command and control system vulnerabilities. In the Indian 
context, such an elaborate system may not be required, but certainly all these aspects 
mentioned above need to be studied as they might be useful when assimilating the whole 
Indian nuclear command and control system.  
 
 
B. U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE  
The nuclear doctrine of a state provides the necessary input for establishing the 
building blocks of a nuclear command and control system. Nuclear doctrine is the single 
most important criteria on which the development, deployment, and employment of 
nuclear forces is based upon. The U.S. nuclear doctrine can be divided into two phases: 
one during the Cold War and the other after the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 
1. Nuclear Doctrine During the Cold War 
Deterrence has remained the cornerstone element of the U.S. nuclear doctrine 
ever since the beginning of the Cold War. Deterrence refers to a policy of preventing or 
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discouraging an action by confronting an opponent with risks he is willing to run.73  The 
concept of deterrence took a major turn after the introduction of nuclear weapons. 
Subsequently, a number of U.S. deterrent strategies have evolved over the years such as 
City Bursting, Massive retaliation, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), Flexible 
response and others. For nuclear deterrence to work it is necessary that the opponent is 
convinced that one has sufficient weapons to retaliate, even after a first strike. Deterrence 
strategies can be divided into three broad categories: deterrence by denial, deterrence by 
punishment, and deterrence by defeat. The U.S. position was deterrence by punishment, 
which means that the side that might start a war would not do so because it would believe 
that the U.S. could inflict “unacceptable damage” (i.e., punishment) on the attacking 
side.74 Deterrence by punishment remained the main theme of the U.S. strategic doctrine 
during the Cold War, and this was demonstrated through different deterrence postures 
attained by the successive U.S. governments. 
The No-First-Use concept, which was suggested many times by the Soviets, was 
always rejected by the United States. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, on April 6, 
1982, summed up the reason for the rejection as “a pledge of No-First-Use effectively 
leaves the West nothing with which to counterbalance the Soviet conventional 
advantages and geopolitical position in Europe.”75 The option of First-Use posture was 
maintained by the United States throughout the Cold War. Another nuclear posture which 
the U.S. maintained during the Cold War was Launch on Warning (LOW). The U.S. 
strategic posture gravitated to this option between the late 1960s and early 1970s, and it 
became entrenched after the U.S. deployed a constellation of early warning satellites in 
the early 1970s.76 
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2. Nuclear Posture Review (2001) 
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2001 takes into account the existing security 
situation which the U.S. faced after the Cold War. It is opined that Russia is no longer an 
enemy, and there is a need to transform the nuclear posture to align with the ongoing 
transformation of the U.S. conventional forces. The salient points of NPR 2001 are 
mentioned below: 
• It is a blueprint for transformation of strategic forces. For the existing 
security situation a mix of capabilities, offensive and defensive, nuclear 
and conventional is required. 
• Replace the strategic Cold War Triad with a New Triad that integrates 
conventional and nuclear offensive strike capabilities, active and passive 
defenses, and a responsive infrastructure to provide a more diverse 
portfolio and capabilities against immediate, potential and unforeseen 
contingencies. The new strategic Triad is depicted in Figure 5. 
• The nuclear Triad will include about one-third of operationally deployed 
warheads of the current strategic nuclear force. Nuclear-armed sea-
launched cruise missiles, removed from ships and submarines under the 
1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, are maintained in a reserve status. 77 
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Figure 5.   The New Triad78 
 
The nuclear doctrine of a country is a by-product of its national strategic posture. 
It is important that the nuclear doctrine be commensurate with the strategic goals of a 
country. A review of the nuclear doctrine at regular intervals is essential so as to align 
itself with the changes in external threats. A nuclear doctrine provides the key guidelines 
for the infrastructure, procedures and technical aids required for raising a new nuclear 
command and control system.  
C. U.S. NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines a command and control system as 
“the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a 
commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces 
pursuant to the mission assigned.”79 The Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) 
provides the necessary support to the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of 
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Staff and combatant commanders of Unified Commands in carrying out the U.S. nuclear 
operations. The NCCS must support situation monitoring, tactical warning, and attack 
assessment of missile launches, senior leader decision making, dissemination of 
Presidential force-direction orders, and management of geographically dispersed forces.80  
The most salient features of the U.S. nuclear command and control system that can be 
taken into account for incorporation into an Indian system are supreme command, 
command centers, and the command and control cycle. 
1. Supreme Command 
The releasing authority for nuclear weapons is the President of the United States, 
who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The U.S. 
government has promulgated a line of succession to the presidency in case of the death of 
the President during a national emergency, such as a nuclear war. The line extends from 
the Vice President to the speaker of the House of Representatives, to the President pro 
tem of the Senate, and thence through nine members of the cabinet, thus providing twelve 
successors to the President.81 
2. Command Centers 
The main component of the NCCS is the National Military Command System 
(NMCS). The NMCS includes the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the 
Alternate National Military Command Center and the National Airborne Operations 
Center (NAOC).  The command nodes and supporting elements of NMCS are depicted in 
Figure 6. The military command centers which are involved in the NMCS and various 
other organizations and command centers associated with U.S. nuclear command and 
control are described in the following paragraphs 
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Figure 6.   National Military Command System Nodes82 
 
 
a. President’s Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) 
Below the East Wing of the White House lies the President’s Emergency 
Operations Center (PEOC), which exists to handle nuclear contingencies.83 The President 
of the United States authorizes and initiates a nuclear weapons strike using a nuclear 
briefcase nicknamed the “Football”. The main contents of the Football are the “Black 
Book” of nuclear weapons launch options as formulated in the Single Integrated 
Operational Plan (SIOP) and the Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) or “go codes” 
needed to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.84 The Football is carried by a military 
officer and follows the President wherever he goes.  
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b. National Military Command Center (NMCC) 
The NMCC is the primary military command center of the United States. 
The NMCC is located in the Joint Staff area of the Pentagon and is responsible for 
generating Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) to Launch Control Centers (LCC), 
nuclear submarines, reconnaissance aircraft, and the battlefield commanders 
worldwide.85 The NMCC primarily serves the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 
c. Site R 
The Site R (R for Raven Rock) at Fort Ritchie, Maryland has been 
designated as Alternate Joint Communication Center (AJCC).86 
d. National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) 
The E-4B serves as the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) for 
the President during a nuclear crisis and augments the NMCC in the Pentagon and 
Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) at Site R.87 The communication 
includes both the Extremely High Frequency (EHF) and Very Low Frequency/High 
Frequency (VLF/HF) links and the E-4B is hardened against Electromagnetic Pulse 
(EMP). 
e. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 
The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a joint combatant 
command based at Offutt AFB in Omaha, Nebraska. Under the Unified Command Plan-
02 (UCP-02), USSTRATCOM has four primary responsibilities: global missile defense; 
global strike; DoD information operations; and global command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).88  
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USSTRATCOM provides command and control support to all the unified commands of 
the United States. The command and control support is administered through the 
following centers. 
• USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center (GOC) is the nerve center of 
USSTRATCOM and updates the commander USSTRATCOM on global 
situations. The commander USSTRATCOM exercises operational 
command and control of the U.S. global strategic forces and, based on the 
Presidential orders, the GOC will execute a global strike mission or send 
EAMs to the strategic nuclear forces.89 
• USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) is the alternate 
command post for the commander USSTRATCOM. The role of ABNCP 
is performed by the E-6B aircraft; it carries Airborne Launch Control 
System (ALCS) and also serves as the Take Charge and Move Out 
(TACAMO) relay for U.S. ballistic missile submarines.90 
• USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC),  
mobile survivable back-up Command, Control, and Communications 
centers for fixed primary facilities of USSTRATCOM and MCCC's 
mission is to provide an enduring mobile command center from which to 
operate during the trans- and post-attack phases of a nuclear attack.91  
f. Cheyenne Mountain Complex (CMC) 
The Cheyenne Mountain Complex (CMC) outside Colorado Springs, 
Colorado is the main correlation center of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack 
Assessment (ITW/AA) system and conducts missile, atmospheric and space warning 
activities for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Space 
Command (USSPACECOM).92 The ITW/AA system uses the inputs from U.S. early 
warning satellite systems and the early warning radar systems. 
The command centers, including alternate and mobile centers, provide the 
necessary command and control link for the political and military leadership with the 
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warfighting forces. The U.S. system is based on a dispersed model so as to absorb a 
massive decapitative strike without ceding a complete annihilation of the command 
centers. The need for the command centers cannot be ruled out as they are the nodes for 
the umbilical link for disseminating orders and receiving feedback such as situational 
reports. For India, the command centers on such a large scale are presently not required, 
but at least one national command center and one military command center (the same as 
the command center of USSTRATCOM) is absolutely essential. 
3. Command and Control Cycle 
The command and control cycle for nuclear operations starts with its peacetime 
operations which might transcend into a crisis, and which if not handled properly, could 
lead to a nuclear war. The command and control of nuclear weapons can usefully be 
divided into seven stages: target planning, strategic warning, tactical warning, attack 
assessment, decision, and orders to the field and post attack assessment.93  Valery E. 
Yarynich has concisely described the U.S. command and control cycle starting from the 
pick-up of a missile attack by the early warning system of the United States: 
A signal from the Cheyenne Mountain Complex is sent to the U.S. 
president, the secretary of defense, the STRATCOM command centers, 
and other joint command centers. After a short teleconference, if a 
decision to retaliate is made, the NCA [president] uses the ‘Football” to 
give a battle action order to the nuclear missile forces (an EAM signal 
with launch codes). At the same time, the U.S. population is informed 
through the EAS system. Reserve command posts, including airborne 
command posts of the NCA (E-4B NAOC) and STRATCOM (E-6B) and 
mobile consolidated command centers of STRATCOM and SPACECOM 
(MCCCs) are activated. The reserve command centers are authorized to 
act if the primary command centers are disabled. The TACAMO E-6A 
aircraft system is activated and deployed. The crews of submarines are 
informed through this system and other long wave (ELF and VLF) radio 
communication systems. Commands from the NCA and STRATCOM, 
including missile launch commands, are transmitted to the ICBM Launch 
Control Centers (LCCs), strategic fighter planes, shore and air 
transmission stations simultaneously through all available communication 
systems (GCCS, SACCS, SLFCS and others) using cable (TCS), short 
wave (HF, UHF), long wave (VLF) and satellite (MILSTAR, 
AFSATCOM, and other) channels. The end-to-end message delivery time 
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to missile launch does not exceed one minute. Minutemen-M and M-X 
missiles are launched by LCCs; however, if the LCCs are disabled, 
remaining missiles can be launched by E-6B aircraft through the ALCC 
terminal.94 
The command and control cycle with its connectivity to various nodes is depicted 






























Figure 7.   National Military Command System Connectivity to the Forces95 
 
During peacetime and crisis, the alert posture of U.S. nuclear forces is declared 
through Defense Conditions (DEFCON). The descriptions of five DEFCON96 are 
mentioned below: 
• DEFCON 5 Normal peacetime readiness. 
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• DEFCON 4 Normal, increased intelligence and strengthened security 
measures. 
• DEFCON 3 Increase in force readiness above normal readiness. 
• DEFCON 2 Further increase in force readiness, but less than maximum 
readiness. 
• DEFCON 1 Maximum force readiness. 
The normal alert status of SAC (predecessor of USSTRATCOM) was a notch 
higher than the rest of the American forces at DEFCON 4, and during the Cuban crisis 
the SAC forces were moved to DEFCON 2.97 
The command and control cycle of the United States is based on LOW to cater for 
a surprise attack; in other conditions the posture will escalate progressively. It is unlikely 
that India would embrace a “hair-trigger” posture of the Cold War. However, the 
communications will play an important role in the command and control of the de-mated 
nuclear arsenal and therefore alternate communications links are absolutely essential. 
Also, the promulgation of defense conditions by the Indian government will not only put 
the nuclear forces on the required alert, but also project the intent of the government.  
D. U.S. EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 
The Early Warning System (EWS) deployed by the United States for providing 
information regarding an approaching missile against the United States can be broadly 
divided into satellite and radar systems. The satellite system provides information on 
missiles shortly after their launch, whereas the radar system is used to detect missiles as 
they approach their targets. 
1. U.S. Early Warning Satellites 
The mainstay of the U.S. early warning satellite system is the constellation of 
geosynchronous satellites belonging to the Defense Support Program (DSP). The first 
DSP satellite was launched in 1970 and since then a number of them have been launched 
with five major upgrades, including capabilities of missile warning missions in mid-wave 
infrared using Mercury Cadmium Telluride (HgCdTe) infrared sensors.98 The DSP 
                                                 
97 Bruce G Blair, “Alerting in Crisis and Conventional War,” in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. 
Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket, (The Brookings Institution, 1987), 78. 
98  U.S. Air Force, “Defense Support Program (DSP),”  
http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/PA/Fact_Sheets/dsp%20fact%20sheet.pdf [Accessed June 12, 2006]. 
47 
satellites provide early warning for ICBMs and the area of coverage of the U.S. early 
warning satellites along with their geosynchronous positions are depicted in Figure 8. 
  
Figure 8.   U.S. Early Warning Satellites and their Coverage Areas99 
 
Within a few years the United States is expected to launch the follow-up to DSP 
satellites, the Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) program. The SBIRS constellation 
supports user requirements in four distinct mission areas: Missile Warning (MW), Missile 
Defense (MD), Technical Intelligence (TI) and Battle Space Awareness (BSA).100 The 
MW and MD scenarios are depicted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.   Space based Infrared System (SBIRS) Operation101 
 
2. U.S. Early Warning Radars 
The mainstay of the U.S. early warning radar system is PAVE PAWS (PAVE is 
an Air Force program name, while PAWS stands for Phased Array Warning System) and 
is operated by the 21st Space Wing squadrons for missile warning and space 
surveillance.102 The radars are used for detecting and tracking SLBMs and ILBMs. The 
location of U.S. early warning radars located in the United States, as well as in 
Flyingdales (UK) and Thule (Greenland), are depicted in Figure 10, along with their area 
of coverage. 
                                                 





Figure 10.   U.S. Early Warning Radar Network. Size of radar fans may not correspond to radar 
detection range103 
The LOW posture of the United States makes stringent demands on the early 
warning systems as they are the stepping stone for the U.S. command and control cycle. 
Any false alarm generated by these early warning systems affects the credibility of these 
systems and sometimes make them unreliable sources. As per the data made available by 
the American government, a total of 1,152 moderately serious false alarms occurred 
during the period from 1977 to 1984, an average of almost three false alarms per week.104  
Given the flight time of the missiles between India and its present adversaries, it is not 
prudent to spend money on early warning systems designed for nuclear command and 
control system. An efficient surveillance system should meet the demands of an Indian 
nuclear command and control system. 
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E. COMMUNICATION NETWORKS  
The U.S. communications network for nuclear command and control includes a 
host of communication links including landlines, laser, satellite, and radio 
communications. The communication links are depicted in Figure 7. 
1. Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) 
The Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) 
provides secure, high fidelity, jam resistant and survivable communications link between 
the NCA [president] and the strategic nuclear forces throughout all phases of strategic 
conflict.105 The MEECN is the replacement for the outdated Ground Wave Emergency 
Network (GWEN). The updated MEECN has the following projects: 
a. Defense IEMATS Replacement Command and Control Terminal 
(DIRECT) 
The Defense Improved Emergency Message Automated Transmission 
System (IEMATS) Replacement Command and Control Terminal (DIRECT) allows the 
CJCS and warfighters to remain responsive to NCA [president] by providing an 
automatic capability to prepare, process, transmit, receive, acknowledge, and re-address 
EAMs on available communication channels.106 
b. ICBM LCC EHF System (ILES) 
The Extremely High Frequency (EHF) project will provide a modernized 
receive/transmit EHF link from the NCA to the ICBM LCCs.107 
c. Modified Miniature Receive Terminal (MMRT) 
The Miniature Terminal provides the NCA and nuclear CINCs 
[Combatant Commanders] with survival C2 link to B-1 and B-52 bombers at the positive 
control turn around point (PCTAP) for EAM communications.108 
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2. Satellite Communications  
U.S. nuclear command and control is heavily dependent on satellite 
communications. U.S. satellite communications can be divided according to their 
operation in various frequency bands. U.S. military satellites along with their frequencies 
of operation are depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.   U.S. Satellites along with their Operating Frequencies109 
 
a. UHF Satellite Communications 
UHF is available worldwide through the Fleet satellite Communications 
System (FLTSATCOM) through the current UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites and they in 
addition carry several UHF payloads like the Air Force Satellite Communications System 
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(AFSATCOM) that provide SATCOM for strategic users.110  The UHF satellites have 
less bandwidth capabilities as compared to the SHF and EHF satellites. The Submarine 
Satellite Information Exchange Subsystem (SSIXS) complements the terrestrial VLF and 
MF/HF communication links between shore-based submarine Broadcast Authorities 
(BCAs) and submarines by providing the capability to receive messages transmitted via 
satellite at scheduled intervals (“Group Broadcasts”).111 
b. SHF Satellite Communications 
The satellites from Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) 
Phase III provide worldwide secure voice and high data communications, and they also 
carry a single channel transponder used for disseminating EAM and Force Direction 
Messages (FDMs) to nuclear capable forces.112 The satellites from DSCS are currently 
the bastion for U.S. worldwide satellite communications. The next generation Wideband 
Gapfiller Satellites (WGS), scheduled to be launched in 2006, can route 2.4 to 3.4 Gbps 
of data - providing more than 10 times the communications capacity of the predecessor 
DSCS III satellite.113 
c. EHF Satellite Communications 
The Military, Strategic, Tactical and Relay (MILSTAR) satellite 
communications system is a secure nuclear-survivable, space-based communication 
system that provides the President, Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Armed Forces with 
assured, survivable satellite communications with low probability of interception and 
detection.114 The Milstar system has three projects: Milstar I, Milstar II and Advanced 
EHF Satellite (the follow-on satellite system). The Advanced EHF (AEHF) satellite 
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system will allow the National Security Council and Unified Combatant Commanders to 
control their tactical and strategic forces at all levels of conflict through nuclear war and 
supports the attainment of information superiority with a capability ranging from 75 bps 
to 8 Mbps.115 
3. Submarine Communications 
The communications with submarines capable of launching SLBMs is mainly 
maintained through connectivity links of ELF, VLF and TACAMO airborne VLF 
communication systems. 
a. ELF Communications 
The U.S. Navy’s ELF Communication transmitter featuring 90 Km wires 
is installed at KI Sawyer Air Force Base in Michigan.116 The ELF is capable of 
penetrating deeper into sea water than VLF transmissions but has the disadvantage of 
very low bandwidth. At a data rate of one bit per minute, compact encoded messages 
signifying orders like “Sub number 20: ascend to VLF depth to receive another message” 
could be transmitted in about ten minutes.117 
b. VLF Communications 
The U.S. Navy’s shore VLF/LF transmitter facilities transmit a 50 baud 
submarine command and control broadcast which is the backbone of the submarine 
broadcast system.118 The sea water penetrating capability of VLF is only to a depth of 
few meters. To receive the teletype broadcast, the submarine must deploy a length of 
antenna within the upper 10 meters or so of the ocean where the VLF waves penetrate.119 
The U.S. operates several VLF/LF transmitters across the globe as depicted in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.   U.S. VLF/LF Site Locations120 
 
c. TACAMO Aircraft 
The E-6B modified and E-6A carries the Take Charge and Move Out 
(TACAMO) communication system used for VLF communication with the fleet ballistic 
missile submarine force.121 The aircraft trail a long wire and maneuver in space such that 
the wire remains vertical. The VLF communication using TACAMO is depicted in 
Figure 13. One TACAMO is always airborne over the Atlantic and one over the Pacific. 
In case a nuclear attack destroyed the shore antennas, TACAMO could deploy its several-
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mile-long trailing wire antenna and relay the EAM from the higher authority to the 
submarines.122 
 
Figure 13.   VLF Trailing Wire Antenna aboard TACAMO Relay Aircraft Broadcasting to U.S. 
Missile Submarines123 
 
4. National Communications System (NCS) 
The National Communications System (NCS) was established in 1963 following 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. It consists of 23 member organizations tasked with ensuring 
that the Federal Government has the Necessary communications under all conditions 
from normal situations to national emergencies and international crises.124 
5. Future Programs 
Future U.S. communications programs are conceptualized to stay abreast with the 
emerging demands of communication and information sharing. 
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a. Global Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) 
The USSTRATCOM is overseeing the development of Global Information 
Grid-Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) which will unleash the U.S. military organizations 
from the currently faced bandwidth constraint during their day-to-day operations. The 
GIG-BE will use an advanced fiber optic backbone and switching technology to upgrade 
telecommunications lines at DOD critical installations, and provide networked services 
with unprecedented bandwidth to operating forces and operational support activities 
(approximately 1,000 times the current capacity to critical DOD sites).125 
b. Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) 
The TSAT will be helpful in the areas where the coverage by optical fiber 
is not possible. In essence, the TSAT will extend the network’s full capabilities to mobile 
and tactical users and will incorporate Internet protocol and laser communications 
capabilities into the Defense Department’s satellite communications constellation.126 
Communications are the crux of a nuclear command and control system. During 
crisis and war, communications do break down and therefore it is necessary to have 
alternate sources of communications. The United States has a host of communications 
networks for nuclear command and control including satellite, radio, optical fiber and 
others. The Indian nuclear command and control system should also be based on a 
multitude of communications network so as to provide secure communications even after 
absorbing the first strike. 
 
F. U.S. TECHNICAL AIDS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL  
Apart from the procedural aspects, the technical aids play a major role in U.S. 
nuclear command and control. 
1. Global Command and Control System (GCCS) 
The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is an automated information 
system designed to support deliberate and crisis planning with the use of an integrated set 
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of analytic tools and flexible data transfer capabilities.127 The GCCS has replaced the 
Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) which was unable to 
provide effective command and control to the growing demand of the U.S. military. The 
GCCS is a Common Operating Environment (COE), integration standard, and migration 
strategy that eliminate the need for inflexible stovepipe command and control systems 
and expensive duplication.128 
2. Strategic Automated Command Control System (SACCS) 
The Strategic Automated Command Control System (SACCS) network is the 
primary network for the transmission of EAM to the war fighting commanders in the 
field in not more than 15 seconds and is located in the CINCSTART [Commander 
USSTRATCOM] command post, strategic command centers, missile launch control 
centers, and at strategic aircraft sites.129 
3. Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) 
The Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) supports USSTRATCOM to 
develop, verify and produce the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) – the nation’s 
strategic war fighting plan and related products.130 
4. Nuclear Planning and Execution System (NPES) 
The Nuclear Planning and Execution System (NPES) is a command and control 
Automated Data Processing (ADP) system intended to support information analysis and 
decision making during peacetime and crises involving strategic nuclear operations by 
proving timely force status information and residue capability data.131 
5. Submarine Satellite Information Exchange Subsystem (SSIXS) 
The submarine satellite Information Exchange Subsystem (SSIXS) is a UHF 
system that provides the submarine’s commander with the capability to exchange 
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encrypted general-service and special-interest text message traffic between SSNs and 
SSBNs and the shore Broadcast Control Authorities (BCAs).132 
The disposition of a large number of nuclear weapons around the world by the 
United States ensured the development of a number of technical aids for controlling its 
nuclear operations. Many of the systems employed by the United States as technical aids 
for controlling a nuclear arsenal are superfluous in the Indian context. But the most 
important system for India would be the control system for transmission and reception of 
Indian EAMs. 
G. U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES 
The nuclear command and control system is the most important and critical 
component in nuclear operations. Today the U.S. nuclear strategy is based on deterrence 
by punishment and deterrence by denial; therefore it is essential that it has survival 
capabilities against a first strike. The relationship between command system 
survivalibility and deterrence depends on the attacker’s confidence in its devastating and 
successful first strike. The command vulnerability has virtually dictated a philosophy of 
early use and the U.S. posture was geared to launch on warning long before the problem 
of Minuteman vulnerability drew attention to it.133  Survivability needs to be attained in 
terms of command authorities, C4I, and the delivery systems which are akin to the brain, 
nervous system, and arms in human anatomy, respectively. The survivability of the U.S. 
delivery systems, which is based on the triad of ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs, figures 
after the survivability of the command authorities and the C4I systems. The question 
about absolute non-survivability of command authority, C4I systems and delivery 
systems after a massive nuclear first strike on the United States is meager. The U.S. C3I 
is the central nervous system of its strategic forces and the Soviets [former opponents] 
would almost certainly attack the U.S. C3I installations for several reasons: 
• To degrade U.S. capabilities to retaliate. 
• To decapitate U.S. forces and deprive them of military leadership. 
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• To degrade U.S. air defense capabilities and facilitate penetration by 
Soviet [opponent] bombers and ALCMs. 
• To degrade U.S. capabilities to wage protracted nuclear war.134 
In this part of the chapter, the focus is on the vulnerabilities associated in a 
decapitating attack against the command authorities (political and military leadership) 
and the C4I systems which are essential components of the command and control system. 
The survival of the delivery system is less of a problem as the nuclear retaliatory strike is 
based on a triad in which the submarines have very high survival capabilities. The United 
States does not have a strategic command system that could survive deliberate attack and 
even 50 nuclear weapons are probably sufficient to eliminate the ability to direct U.S. 
strategic forces to coherent purposes.135 Vulnerability is not only a function of one’s own 
capabilities to defend against a first strike, but it is also dependent on the capabilities of 
the opponent. The end of the Cold War has certainly reduced the tensions between the 
United States and Russia. But Russia still remains the only country capable of making a 
decapitating strike against the United States. Russia has about 3,500 nuclear warheads 
capable of reaching the continental United States; by comparison, China has only 18 
single-warhead missiles that can reach the U.S. homeland.136 A high confidence technical 
solution to command system vulnerability probably cannot be achieved at a feasible 
cost;137  nevertheless, it is worthwhile to see the steps taken by the U.S. to mitigate 
command vulnerabilities.  
1. Vulnerability of National Command Authorities 
The U.S. government has promulgated a list of successors to the President of the 
U.S. in case the President dies during a nuclear attack. The problem is aggravated as most 
of these successors also work in the Washington D.C. area. Chances are high that they 
would also be killed during the nuclear attack, and it will be very difficult to ascertain 
who is in charge. The U.S. government has delegated the Federal Emergency 
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Management Agency (FEMA) as the authenticating agency. FEMA keeps a daily tab on 
the whereabouts of the President and his 16 successors and is also responsible for briefing 
presidential successors on plans for their dispersal during attack and on procedures for 
reporting their locations at all times.138  As mentioned earlier a surprise nuclear attack 
against United States is not likely, and therefore during the development of a crisis 
FEMA would have taken adequate measures regarding dispersal of the presidential 
successors. After the 9/11 attacks, the President was taken to the strategic forces 
headquarters and the Vice President was whisked away to a secret location and was in 
constant touch with the President and other members of the National Security Council 
through safe and uninterruptible communication channels.139 
2. Vulnerability of C4I Systems 
The vulnerability of U.S. C4I is two-fold, namely physical destruction and 
communications disruption because of physical destruction or through Electromagnetic 
Pulse (EMP) attacks. 
a. Physical Destruction 
The U.S. C4I systems are vulnerable to nuclear attacks as it would 
physically destroy the command centers including airborne and mobile, communications 
centers such as EHF and VLF transmitters, early warning and communications satellites, 
satellite control centers, ICBMs LCCs and others associated with the U.S. nuclear 
command and control system. The physical destruction of these sites mentioned above 
can be prevented by active and passive measures. The active means of defense started in 
the form of Strategic Defense Initiate (SDI) in the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan, 
and today it has taken the shape of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The passive defense 
can be achieved through concealment and mobility. The concealment of fixed sites is 
achieved by physically hardening the sites and also has redundancy developed in the 
system to cater for vulnerabilities associated with C4I systems. None of the C4I assets are 
hardened enough to withstand the nuclear attack.140 But, as seen earlier, all the major 
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command and communications centers have substantial redundancy in the form of 
alternate, airborne and mobile facilities. 
The U.S. nuclear command and control system is highly dependent on 
satellites which provide early warning and communications. The physical destruction of 
satellites using Anti Satellite weapons (ASAT) is difficult to achieve, and moreover the 
idea is averse to Russia and China, the two potential adversaries.141 The physical attack 
on the satellite control terminals and jamming of the data and control links is a more 
lucrative and achievable path. A number of measures have been taken to protect the 
satellites against jamming including spread spectrum techniques, switching to anti-jam 
mode, using directional antennas, error correcting codes and many others. 
b. Communication Disruption by Physical Destruction or by 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attacks 
The fixed command and communications centers which are not hardened 
enough are the most vulnerable sites to a nuclear attack as they will be physically 
destroyed if the attack is successful (i.e., it has not been intercepted by active means such 
as BMD). On the other hand, the mobile communication centers and the mobile satellite 
terminals are hard to target if they are concealed efficiently. However, their performance 
will degrade if they are on transit. The Airborne command centers are impractical to 
attack with ballistic missiles even if tracked continuously, since they travel hundreds of 
miles in the half-hour flight time of an ICBM.142  
The effects of various EMP attacks are as follows: 
• A High Altitude EMP (HEMP) explosion above an altitude of 40 Km 
radiates radio waves of potentially harmful intensity. 
• The System Generated EMP (SGEMP) generates EMP within the body of 
a satellite by radiation from a distant detonation in space. 
• The Source Region EMP (SREMP) occurs in the immediate vicinity of a 
nuclear burst within the atmosphere and is important only for targets 
designed to withstand nearby bursts, such as antennas serving ICBM silos 
and radars for some ballistic missile defenses. 143 
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The waveform summary of an EMP attack is tabulated in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. EMP Waveform Summary144 
 
To harden against EMP is very challenging as it is almost impossible to 
completely harden a site. But certainly a lot of work has been done to achieve HEMP 
hardness and the United States has been the world leader in HEMP technology since the 
first article appeared in the early 1960s.145  The EMP hardening approaches are encasing 
critical electronics in a sealed conducting box, inserting “surge arresters”, designing more 
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rugged electronic circuits and programming computers to restart themselves if they suffer 
transient disruption.146 
The United States are pioneers in the field of passive and active defenses 
against an incoming missile attack. These efforts are admirable as they reduce the 
vulnerabilities associated with a decapitating first strike. In view of its NFU policy, a first 
strike against India by China or Pakistan is going to be a decisive blow in view of the 
presumably small number of nuclear arsenals and command and control facilities 
available in India. Therefore, India should consider all the measures taken by the United 
States such as alternate command authorities, alternate command centers, hardening of 
missile silos and command centers against EMP attacks and creating India’s own 
National Missile Defense system.   
H. EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. NEGATIVE CONTROL 
Under normal peacetime circumstances, strategic forces and supporting C3I 
systems follow routines that maintain negative control, which is defined as the prevention 
of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.147 The aim of negative 
control is to prevent inadvertent war through strict assertive control. The positive control 
on the other hand is the transmission of deliberate and effective instructions to undertake 
strategic attacks.148   A decapitation attack which is a threat to positive control, forces the 
national leaders to delegate authority during a major crisis. The positive and negative 
controls are diametrically opposite requirements in a command and control system which 
is essential for conducting nuclear operations. Therefore a fine balance is to be 
maintained for protection against decapitation and against unwanted use of nuclear 
weapons. This can be achieved through technical and organizational means which have to 
be incorporated into the command and control system. 
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The oversight of the DOD nuclear surety program149 is provided by Deputy 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, DATSD (NM). The standards 
which the DATSD (NM) maintains as part of its operation are depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.    DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards150 
An effective negative control of the U.S. nuclear weapons is maintained through 
the following technical and operational measures: 
1. Permissive Action Links (PALs) 
The permissive action links provide the authorities with the ability to achieve “use 
control” by decoupling control of the weapon from the possession of the weapon.151 
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PALs are codes for arming circuits of the weapon which prevent it from being armed 
until [a] proper[ly] authorized enabling code is inserted.152  
The U.S. command and control system involves two types of codes, 
authenticating (EAMs) and Enabling (PAL), and it is likely that whoever holds the 
enabling codes is also in the chain of command that will transmit the order containing the 
authorizing codes down to the executing officer.153 The effectiveness of PALs is limited 
by the code management system and is given high priority in the United States. 
The warheads of SLBMs do not have PALs and the launch is authorized through  
a Navy nuclear weapons surety program in which the receipt of the launch message is 
verified by two officers and the launch process involves most of the crew.154  
2. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) 
The PRP identifies personnel who are reliable for performing duties associated 
with nuclear operations. Only those personnel who have demonstrated the highest degree 
of individual reliability for allegiance, trustworthiness, conduct, behavior, and 
responsibility are allowed to perform duties associated with nuclear weapons, and they 
are evaluated continuously for adherence to PRP standards.155 
3. Two-Man Rule 
The two-man rule control concept led to elaborate systems for launch control of 
ICBM and SLBM strategic missiles and requires every sensitive action taken with 




                                                 
152 Ibid., 49. 
153 Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 38. 
154 Cotter, “Peacetime Operations,” 52. 
155 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP),” Directive 
Number 5210.42, January 8, 2001, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d521042_010801/d521042p.pdf [Accessed June 27, 2006]. 
156 Cotter, “Peacetime Operations,” 50. 
66 
 
4. Code Management 
The National Security Agency (NSA) is in charge of distributing the daily launch 
codes to the White House, Pentagon, STRATCOM and the TACAMO aircraft.157 It is 
presumed that the NSA provides the authenticating (EAMs) as well as enabling (PALs) 
codes. 
The effectiveness of negative control in a democratic society needs no emphasis. 
India should adopt all the measures mentioned above by the United States in order to 
bolster its own effectiveness of negative control.  
I. U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The civil-military relations play an important role in the nuclear command and 
control system of a country as it determines the disposition of the system by defining as 
delegative or assertive control. In the United States, civil-military relations have been 
healthy with a professional military which has remained subordinated to civilian control. 
However, it does not imply that the United States was bereft of civil-military conflicts 
over the control of nuclear operations.158 There was a continuous rift over the control 
issues of nuclear operations where the civilians preferred assertive control and the 
military wanted delegative control. Despite a pronounced preference for assertive control, 
however, civilian leaders have actually tolerated a relatively high degree of delegation in 
the nuclear command and control system, to make the system more survivable or the 
deterrent more credible.159 It was presumed that the delegative control was necessary for 
a decapitative strike by the Soviets. In some aspects, the United States tolerated more 
delegative control than the Soviet Union did, even given comparable strategic 
situations.160 During the Cold War, the SLBM capable submarines were deployed 
without PALs and they remained an extreme example of delegative control. However, the 
NPR 2001 eliminates Peacekeeper ICBMs, removes 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic 
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service, and downloads weapons from Trident SLBMs, Minuteman III ICBMs, and B-
52H and B-2 bombers.161 These reductions and downloading of weapons pave a new 
path for assertive control post Cold War. 
The strategic threat to India does not warrant a delegative control and an assertive 
control should support the requirements from a strategic perspective. 
J. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The cost of nuclear operations can be divided into three categories: the 
manufacture and maintenance of a nuclear arsenal, delivery platforms, and the command 
and control systems. The estimates of U.S. expenditures in these three categories (in 
constant 1996 dollars) are included in Table 8. 
Building the Bomb Deploying the Bomb 
Targeting & Controlling the 
Bomb 
Purpose % $ Value (billions) Purpose % 
$ Value 





District 6.3 25.6 
Strategic 
Offensive 




Communications 21.9 182 
Fissile 
Materials 
Production 40.4 165.5 
Tactical 
Offensive 

















and Testing 9.1 37.4 
Aircraft Nuclear 
Propulsion 0.2 7 
Space Shuttle & 
Space Support 3.1 26 
Others 1.6 6.3 
Naval Nuclear 
Propulsion 1.6 51 
Others 
13.5 112.3 
Total 100 409.4 Total 100 3241 Total 100 831.1 
Total    $ 4481.5 Billions 
 
Table 8.  Cost of United States Nuclear Operations162 
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The deployment of strategic forces includes the cost incurred on the non-nuclear 
platforms as most of the delivery vehicles would have dual purposes. A careful analysis 
of the data in Table 8 shows that targeting and controlling the bomb is approximately 
nineteen percent of the total expenditure of the United States’ nuclear operations. The 
intelligence share in targeting and controlling the bomb is approximately sixty percent 
and is clearly the largest contributor towards expenditure incurred on nuclear command 
and control. In the case of India, the early warning systems are not envisaged and hence 
the strategic command, control and communications and continuity of government 
bunkers would incur the maximum expenditure. 
K. CONCLUSION 
The command and control system of the United States is an elaborate and robust 
system which has matured over the years. The nuclear doctrine of the Cold War has been 
given a new direction by NPR 2001 in which the integration of conventional and strategic 
forces will take place. With the end of Cold War the U.S. is no longer required to 
maintain such a vast nuclear command and control system. However, during and after the 
Cold War the U.S. has maintained a fine balance of positive and negative control through 
highly advanced technical and organizational measures. The emerging nuclear states can 
learn a lot from the past experiences of the U.S. and develop a nuclear command and 
control system to suit their nuclear strategy based on technical and organizational 
measures sustained by the United States. 
The U.S. nuclear command and control system is structured on four basic 
elements: nuclear doctrine, civil-military relations, technology and finance (see Figure 
15). The core of the nuclear command and control system is the nuclear doctrine which 
caters to the perceived threat. Civil-military relations cater to the organizational set-up for 
controlling nuclear weapons. Technology assists in catering to the command and control 
requirements of political and military leadership. The necessary finance is used for 
setting up this huge command and control system with global reach. The civil-military 
relations and technical elements provide the necessary political and technical control of 
the nuclear weapons. 
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Figure 15.   Nuclear Command and Control System Model 
The LOW nuclear posture of the United States is incongruous in the Indian 
context. However, except for the non-relevance of early warning systems in the Indian 
context, all other constituents of the U.S. nuclear command and control system are highly 
applicable for an Indian nuclear command and control system. It is pertinent to note here 
that some of the systems are not required on such an elaborate scale as is the case in U.S. 
systems, and they include communications network, technical aids required for U.S. 









































IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN NUCLEAR COMMAND 
AND CONTROL  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The case study of the nuclear command and control system of the United States 
implies the necessity for close attention to four aspects: nuclear doctrine, civil-military 
relations, technology and finance. The first and foremost consideration is nuclear 
doctrine, which is based on the threat perceived, and determines the nuclear policies and 
posture of a nuclear weapons state. Civil-military relations and the technology available 
determine the organizational procedures and technical support to the civilian control of 
nuclear operations. The financial element encompasses the building and maintenance of 
the nuclear arsenal, the delivery platforms, and the nuclear command and control 
systems. 
In the Indian context, the promulgated nuclear doctrine is based on NFU, which 
entails restraint and retaliation only against a nuclear first strike. The adoption of an NFU 
policy is unique, as none of the declared nuclear weapon states, except China, follow 
such a declaratory policy. According to former Defense Minister Jaswant Singh, “No 
other country has debated so carefully and, at times, torturously over the dichotomy 
between its sovereign security needs and global disarmament instincts, between a 
moralistic approach and a realistic one, and between a covert nuclear policy and an overt 
one."163 The NFU and the de-mated nuclear posture of India simplify its command and 
control system during peacetime, but pose an equally challenging burden on nuclear 
operations during crisis and war. The command and custody arrangement of nuclear 
weapons for India during peacetime demonstrates a low credible deterrent. The mating of 
nuclear arsenal after a first strike will be a challenging task because the possible lack of 
political leadership and certain disarray of communication systems will pose an extra 
burden on the decision-making process. It is then pertinent to find a nuclear posture that 
suits the NFU policy, is commensurate with the threat perceived, demonstrates “true” 
credible deterrence, suits the unique Indian civil-military relations, is assertive in control, 
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and last but not least, is financially viable. Without the nuclear command and control 
system, the nuclear posture would be like having a car with four wheels but without a 
steering system.  
The division of the nuclear command and control system looks simpler to study in 
the four aspects of nuclear doctrine, civil-military relations, technology, and finance, but 
it is difficult to formulate a new command and control system under these aspects. This is 
because there are overlaps in the four aspects mentioned above and many finer details are 
left out, but these are required at the beginning to set up a complex organization such as a 
nuclear command and control system.  
The formulation of a new command and control system for India can be based on 
administrative, operational, and technical elements. Civil-military relations and the 
financial implications are aspects which come under the administrative element. The 
operational element demonstrates the advocated command and control cycle and would 
involve civilian leadership, the military and nuclear scientists in various roles associated 
with the Indian nuclear posture. With the technical elements, India should attain certain 
technological capabilities to carry out its nuclear operations. The cooperation in technical 
elements from strategic partners such as the United States could assist India in setting up 
a robust command and control system. The recommendations for the Indian Nuclear 
Command and Control System (INCCS) for consideration would be covered under 
administrative, operational, and technical elements. The assistance from strategic partners 
and the secondary roles of INCCS are also covered in this chapter. 
B. ADMINISTRATION 
Any organizational system involving the military can be fabricated with two basic 
components: administration and operational. This basic bifurcation allows us to put 
things in the right perspective. The aspects of INCCS, which have no direct connection 
with the day to day military operation, fall into the domain of administration. It includes 
and is not restricted to the promulgation of nuclear doctrine, policy, posture, chain of 
command and designated successors, civilian control over nuclear operations based on 
civil-military relations, command and control cycle, nuclear signaling, alert status of 
73 
nuclear forces and financial aspects of nuclear operations. The administrative elements of 
INCCS are covered in succeeding sub-paragraphs. 
1. Analysis of Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine 
The Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) was presented to then Prime Minister Shri A. 
B. Vajpayee and to the cabinet by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on 
August 19, 1999, and was subsequently released by the National Security Advisor for 
public debate. It constituted a major move toward clarifying most of the Indian nuclear 
issues even though it has not been approved by parliament as yet. The Draft Nuclear 
Doctrine of India is unique in the sense that it has been promulgated before India had 
obtained the capabilities mentioned in it.164 The nuclear doctrine is logically the first step 
toward building a robust command and control system. The Indian government made the 
right decision to choose the appropriate nuclear strategy, and as mentioned in the draft 
doctrine, subsequently planned for building the capabilities mentioned in it. It is prudent 
here that strategy should drive the technology and not the other way around, because 
there are huge financial implications to build up a novel command and control system. In 
order to look at the command and control structure, it is imperative that the Indian 
nuclear doctrine is carefully analyzed as all the issues of nuclear command and control 
are derived from it. 
 
a. NFU and its Relevance 
Former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had declared in a policy 
statement in parliament on August 4, 1998 that India’s nuclear doctrine will be based on 
the morally justifiable concept of ‘No-First-Use’ and that India will maintain “a 
minimum but credible nuclear deterrent.”165 Subsequent to the policy statement by the 
Prime Minister the proposed nuclear doctrine emerged on a No-First-Use policy and the 
need to develop a “credible minimum deterrent”. An NFU policy has been formulated by 
the government so that civilians retain affirmative control over nuclear weapons. The 
Indian NFU retaliation-only nuclear doctrine has been carefully articulated, and it reflects 
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the maturity and restraint adopted by India which befits India’s availability of warning 
time before any significant military attack by either of its two adversaries, Pakistan or 
China.   
The No-First-Use policy fits well into India’s strategic culture. However, 
it can be claimed that the first use of nuclear weapons is a better form of deterrence, and 
further, India does not have to justify its second strike capabilities against a decapatative 
strike by China. The second strike capabilities could be practicable with Pakistan, but 
India needs to rethink this policy in the case of China. The No-First-Use policy of India is 
very well crafted, and Indian government remains steadfast on its decision to abide by 
NFU policy, but a number of factors need to be considered when formulating the nuclear 
posture based on NFU. 
First, the survivability of the nuclear arsenal and the command, control 
and communication organization after absorbing multiple first strikes from an adversary, 
especially by China, is a difficult situation to assess. It all depends upon the deception 
capabilities, number of nuclear weapons, and the robustness of the command and control 
structure of India. The shock and chaos which will prevail in India after absorbing the 
nuclear first strike is unimaginable, and the command and control of the limited nuclear 
arsenal will be in disarray, and the successful weaponization of the nuclear arsenal during 
these chaotic times could be a big challenge. On the other hand, a crisis situation with 
China may make it obligatory for the Indian political leaders to pre-delegate the launch 
authority to military commanders in order to avert a complete annihilation by the 400-
odd Chinese nuclear weapons.166  
Second, an all out bolt-from-the blue attack on India from China is 
unlikely. But the occupation of the small corridor north of West Bengal, which links 
central India with its North Eastern states, by the Chinese could compel India to use 
nuclear weapons on her own soil. 
Third, a No-First–Use policy makes sense for India if two of its nuclear 
adversaries, Pakistan and China, sign a similar multilateral pledge of No-First-Use and 
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strengthen India’s quest for averting a nuclear war in South Asia. It is doubtful that these 
two countries will come out with a No-First-Use policy with India. The No-First-Use 
policy of China has diluted over the years which has now reconciled that the No-First-
Use does not apply to territories that belong to China, and in this regard China could 
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in Arunachal Pradesh in India which China still 
claims as its own territory.167 Pakistan, with conventional forces which are inferior in 
quality and quantity to those of India, is unlikely to embrace the No-First-Use policy. 
Similarly, the conventional superiority of the Chinese Armed Forces make the No-First-
Use pledge by India redundant as a loss of huge territory to the Chinese might force India 
to use nuclear weapons. It can be safely assumed that a weaker state is unlikely to accept 
a No-First-Use policy and this pledge by India against China may not be viable. 
Fourth, a simultaneous attack on Indian territory by China and Pakistan 
could be an unmanageable situation for the Indian armed forces, and India would have to 
rethink its NFU pledge. Though a simultaneous attack by China and Pakistan on Indian 
soil has not happened in the past, India was concerned about Pakistan’s involvement in 
the Indo-Chinese war in 1962 and the Chinese involvement during the Indo-Pakistan war 
in 1971. 
Fifth, national security and the threat to the state’s existence should be the 
underpinning factor in deciding a nuclear doctrine and the subsequent posture. During the 
Cold War, in spite of a large number of false alarms and some close quarter situations 
like the Cuban missile crisis, the two superpowers didn’t go the nuclear route besides 
their policy based on first use.  
b. Issue of Credible Deterrence 
The second pillar of the Indian draft nuclear doctrine is the pursuance of 
credible minimum deterrence. The meaning of minimum seems vague: the “minimum” 
connotes different things for different countries. In order to specify how many minimum 
nuclear weapons are required to deter Pakistan and China is a very difficult question to 
answer. To spell out what is minimum is challenging, and according to Mohammad A 
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Alam what is credible may not be minimal and India may have to adopt a maximalist 
position in order to maintain deterrence.168  
What is strategic deterrence? If we say India deters Pakistan, it means that 
India fears that Pakistan intends to act against its interests and takes steps to persuade 
Pakistan that this would be as unwise as it would be unwelcome.169 In nuclear parlance, 
deterrence is preventing an adversary from carrying out a nuclear attack through the 
threat of punishment. The credibility of deterrence depends not only on the actions of the 
state which is trying to deter, but also on the state which is being deterred. During the 
Cold War the two superpowers based their deterrence on Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD). In a crisis in the Taiwan straits, the United States would have to consider 
Chinese nuclear capabilities and would likely handle the situation very cautiously. On the 
other hand, Chinese Premier Mao Zedong once told Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
that even if 300 million Chinese perished in a nuclear war, the remaining 300 million 
Chinese would build a new glorious civilization.170  
 India’s objective is to pursue a credible deterrence and is based on 
punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor. 
A credible deterrence against its adversaries, China and Pakistan, should not only be 
based on the number of nuclear weapons held but also on other factors such as political 
will, transparency in policy and organization, force level, and the active involvement of 
the military who are going to be the operators of these weapons. 
Since the opening of public debate on the Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine, a 
number of analysts have suggested their own assessment of the minimum number of 
nuclear weapons required by India in order to deter its adversaries and thereby keep a 
nuclear war at bay. The recommendations of responsible India analysts vary from a 
minimalist two dozen nuclear bombs to a maximalist figure of over 400, which is close to 
rival China’s current arsenal.171 
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The credibility of deterrence is a difficult question to answer as it reflects 
the psychological impact of the adversary, which is hard to gauge in advance of a crisis. 
Deterrence can fail because the target does not grasp the situation or is inclined to foolish 
interpretations.172 The Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1999 proved that Indian 
deterrence had failed as the Pakistan Army invaded the Kargil region of India despite 
India being a nuclear state. A number of reasons could be attributed to the failure of 
deterrence against Pakistan. First, Pakistani leaders assumed that possession of nuclear 
weapons by Pakistan would act as a counterbalance. The restraint shown by the political 
leadership during the Kargil war should not be construed as lack of political will as has 
always been understood by Pakistan. The overarching conventional superiority of the 
Indian armed forces over Pakistan made no sense to escalate the war in the direction of 
nuclear holocaust as Pakistan would have been forced to use its nuclear weapons once it 
started losing territory. Second, deterrence could have failed because of the lack of 
transparency in policy and organization as the Draft Nuclear Doctrine was formulated 
after the Kargil war. 
To put up a credible deterrence against China, which claims the whole of 
Arunachal Pradesh up to Brahmaputra River in the Assam plains and rejects Indian 
sovereignty over Sikkim, has to be viewed seriously and with concern. 173 China has been 
an aggressive and expansionist country since the takeover by the communist government. 
Ignoring China could be viewed as “strategic procrastination” as New Delhi cannot 
afford another 1962 debacle. Indo-Chinese relations have deteriorated since the late 
1980s, when in 1986 Chinese forces stormed the Sumdorong Chu valley of Arunachal 
Pradesh and it is estimated that around the same time China began to deploy tactical 
nuclear missiles around the Lanzhou-Chengdu regions, and it maintains three missile 
divisions in the area.174  
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Looking at the intent and past history of China, it is imperative for India to 
put up a plausible deterrence which demonstrates the steadfastness of Indian leaders in 
using nuclear weapons against anybody who interferes in Indian territory. China has 
deployed a large number of missiles, and all the short range ballistic missiles such as 
CSS-2s and CSS 5s (1700 Km range) are meant for immediate neighbors,175 and 
approximately 20 ICBMs are meant to deter the United States176 For a credible 
deterrence against China it is also imperative that India possesses the requisite delivery 
systems to target any city in China. The delivery system is the most critical element in the 
nuclear weapons program in terms of range, reliability, operational readiness and 
numbers.177 In this regard the possession of Agni III with a range of over 3000 Km or a 
SLBM launch capable nuclear submarine would provide the necessary credibility against 
China, and hence these programs should be followed up vigorously.178Credibility also 
depends on whether the weapons are deployed or not as the deployment of 20 ICBMs by 
China is a credible deterrence against the United States. India should consider deploying 
its missile forces as this act would provide credibility to its nuclear deterrence. 
c. Safety of Indian Cities 
In a nuclear war, the adversary is most likely to attack the large cities of 
India which are big industrial bases and have large population densities. Most of the 
developed nations like the United States, Britain, Japan, Russia and even China have 
underground metro railway systems in all their major cities to protect their citizens from a 
nuclear attack. The Indian nuclear strategy and doctrine should also look into protection 
of its citizens and an underground railway system seems to be the best option. India 
presently only has an underground metro railway system in New Delhi and Calcutta and 
should consider having such systems in its next 10-15 largest cities. 
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d. Attack on Nuclear Facilities 
Clause 4.1 of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine mentions retaliation with 
sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction … if nuclear weapons are used against 
India and its forces. But there is no mention about India’s retaliation if a conventional 
attack is made on the known nuclear facilities such as CIRIUS and Dhruv nuclear 
reactors. For that matter, the issue will become more critical, especially during a crisis, if 
a conventional torpedo attack is made upon an Indian SLBM launch capable nuclear 
submarine as and when it joins the Fleet.  
e. Designated Successors 
The DND of India states that the authority to release nuclear weapons for 
use resides in person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s). In the 
case of the United States, the government has promulgated 16 successors to the 
presidency and FEMA has been made the authenticating agency to confirm the 
legitimacy of a claiming candidate depending upon the reports received about the rest of 
the successors. Unlike in the American system where there is a clear chain of command 
should the President be incapacitated due to death, resignation or impeachment, there is 
no provision in the Indian constitution other than following the official protocol in order 
of precedence.179 It is opined that the disclosure of the designated successors to the Prime 
Minister of India would remove the unnecessary speculations and rumors at the time of 
crisis after a successful first strike against India in which the Prime Minister is 
incapacitated. For that matter an agency akin to FEMA would be required in order to 
determine the political leader after a first strike on New Delhi, as most of the designated 
successors are likely to be working in the capital. Any nuclear chain of command in India 
needs to cater to the unique politico-military set-up in India which includes civilian 
leadership, bureaucrats (non-elected representatives) and military leadership. The 
recommended civil, bureaucratic, and military chain of command for INCCS is shown in 
Table 9. 
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Civilian Leadership Bureaucratic Leadership Military Leadership 
Prime Minister National Security Advisor Chief of Staff Committee 
(COSC) 
Deputy Prime Minister Cabinet Secretary Chief of Army, Navy or Air 
Force in order of their length of 
service if not COSC 
Minister of Defense Defense Secretary C-in-C Strategic Force Command 
Minister of Home Affairs Home Secretary Vice Chiefs of Army, Navy or 
Air Force in order of their length 
of service 
Minister of External Affairs Foreign Secretary Designated Army, Navy or Air 
Force Officer commanding the 
nuclear forces 
Minister of Finance Finance Secretary  
Other Cabinet Ministers 
nominated at the time of Cabinet 
formation or at the time of their 
induction as Cabinet Minister 
Respective Secretaries  
 
   Table 9. Indian Nuclear Chain of Command 
 
Table 9 provides the vertical structure in each leadership (civilian, 
bureaucratic and military) of the nuclear command and control chain and may or may not 
provide the horizontal chain of command. The civilian leadership has been chosen based 
on their relevance attached to the INCCS, and the Deputy Prime Minister may hold any 
of the portfolios in the Cabinet ministry. The vertical structure of the bureaucratic 
leadership may not conform to the seniority of the secretaries after the Cabinet secretary 
and it has been structured based on their ministries. 
In spite of its inherent drawbacks of demonstrating a low credible 
deterrent, NFU, as per government’s guidelines, will continue to drive the Indian nuclear 
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policy. In the land of Mahatma Gandhi the use of nuclear weapons will be denounced but 
measures need to be taken so as not to compromise the strategic security. The Indian 
nuclear doctrine is based on unshakeable NFU policy and minimum credible deterrence 
and these two needs to be reviewed periodically. 
 
2. Nuclear Posture 
The nuclear doctrine, policy, and posture are the circles within which a nuclear 
command and control system is established and is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Establishment of Nuclear Command and Control System 
 
 
 The nuclear posture is a derivative of nuclear policy, which in turn is a derivative 
of nuclear doctrine. The nuclear command and control system is the linchpin on which 
the entire nuclear operation is sustained. The relationship between all these aspects is 
shown in Figure 17. 
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                      Stage 1              Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4 
 
Figure 17.   Formulation of Nuclear Command and Control System 
 
There is a considerable debate in India over the establishment of stages 2 and 3 of 
Figure 20. At stage 2, the nuclear policy of India is hooked to NFU and a number of 
analysts and strategists have written about the viability of NFU in the Indian Context. 
Rear Admiral Raja Menon asserts that in the event that an intelligence warning of a 
‘definite’ nuclear strike is received, the NCP will have to consider, among the other 
options, a first launch.180  Another analyst, P. R. Chari, concludes that India’s NFU 
pledge in the nuclear doctrine only make a political statement; it will not be taken 
seriously by anyone abroad or in India.181 Most of these comments on the relevance of 
NFU in the Indian context came immediately after the promulgation of DND. Today the 
NFU policy has stood the test of two successive governments, both with differing 
ideologies. It remains clear that if India is resolute in its commitment of the NFU pledge, 
the nuclear posture of India then needs to grow out of that NFU policy. The current de-
mated nuclear posture of India provides utmost assertive control during peacetime but the 
smooth transition from peacetime to crisis or after a first strike is difficult to achieve. 
According to Lt. General Pran Pahwa, “anyone who has functioned under time pressure 
and in the stressed environment of war knows that a certain amount of pre-planning, 
delegation of command, extensive exercises simulating various contingencies and 
rehearsals of drills and procedures are required to achieve the desired level of 
effectiveness and this can only be possible if the system is deployed in peace.”182 
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Moreover, does the de-mated posture demonstrate the “minimum credible deterrence” 
policy of India? It can be argued that the NFU policy in itself is quite restricting and a de-
mated posture on top of it makes the “minimum credible deterrence” non-existent. 
NFU    +       De-mated Posture     ≠   Minimum Credible Deterrence                (1)   
Before deciding a nuclear posture for India which demonstrates minimum 
credible deterrence along with a NFU policy, one first needs to look at the options 
available for India. Table 10 provides all the nuclear posture options available, some of 
them are well defined and some are included in the study for further clarifications. 
However, it is pertinent to note here that the descriptions of nuclear postures mentioned 
in Table 10 may or may not conform to the existing nuclear postures around the world.  
  
Nuclear Posture Description 
De-mated The nuclear warhead comprising of core and trigger assembly are stored 
separately. The nuclear warhead is also stored away from delivery platforms. It is 
assumed that the retaliatory strike would take more than a day and depends upon 
the success of the first strike. 
Delayed Second 
Strike(DSS) 
The nuclear warhead i.e. core and trigger assembly are stored separately but close 
to the delivery platforms such that a retaliatory strike is possible within a day. 
Launch After Attack 
(LAA) 
The nuclear warhead is assembled with at least one delivery platform of the triad 
(ICBMs, Bombers, and SLBMs) and a retaliatory strike is possible within hours 




The nuclear warhead is assembled with at least any two delivery platforms of the 
triad and a retaliatory strike are undertaken immediately after the confirmation of 
a nuclear detonation. 
Launch On Warning 
(LOW) 
The nuclear warhead is assembled with all the delivery platforms of the triad and 
a retaliatory strike is undertaken on warning of an incoming strike. 
 
Table 10. Nuclear Postures with Descriptions 
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The robustness of the nuclear command and control system required and the 
reliance on the early warning systems increases as one proceeds from a de-mated posture 
to a LOW posture. The spectrum of nuclear postures that can be attained by India to 










Figure 18.   The spectrum of Nuclear Postures 
 
The de-mated and the LOW postures are at the two extreme poles of the nuclear 
posture spectrum. Both have their own pros and cons. The pros of one end are the cons of 
the other end, and vice versa. The mating of warheads with delivery vehicles during times 
of tension faces two basic problems: first, a tendency to act speedily carries a significant 
risk with respect to safety, and second the adversary perceives it to be highly 
threatening.183  Another problem with mating during a crisis is that it can fuel the fire of 
an existing crisis and things may escalate such that an adversary is tempted to launch a 
pre-emptive strike before the mating process. The threat perceived by India neither 
dictates the requirement of LOW posture nor is the threat so low that a de-mated posture 
would meet the requirements of “minimum credible deterrence.” The LAA posture, on 
                                                 











the other hand, is a mid-course between the de-mated and LOW nuclear posture. It 
demonstrate “ready” deterrence and eliminates the requirements of smooth transition 
from peacetime to crisis and, if required, to a nuclear war. The prerequisites of elaborate 
early warning systems can be dispensed with in the LAA nuclear posture. Also, the 
operationalization of the LAA posture would be easier to implement than the LOW 
posture and it will be discussed separately. Therefore, keeping the strategic threat in mind 
in which India is confronted by two nuclear armed neighbors and the benchmark of 
“minimum credible deterrence,” it is recommended that the LAA nuclear posture be 
adopted by India. The de-mated posture is like having a car with flat tires. 
NFU   +    LAA nuclear posture = Minimum Credible Deterrence           (2) 
3. Civil-Military Relations 
K. Subrahmanyam, a noted Indian strategist, has stated, "it is not only inescapable 
that the armed forces would be involved but to project deterrence they should also be 
seen to be involved . . . . A minimum deterrent should demonstrate its credibility through 
the command and control system and the overt and publicized involvement of the armed 
forces... Unfortunately, in India, a large section of our political class does not understand 
issues like long lead times in defense preparedness. . . ".184   Finally, it will be the 
military that will plan the tactics of a nuclear war and this can’t be done based on scanty 
information. The inputs from the Indian Armed Forces with their impeccable record of 
professionalism should definitely be valuable by the political leaders in realizing their 
strategic goals. 
Civil-military relations are very important in formulating the type of control 
(delegative vs. assertive) in a nuclear command and control system. The always/never 
dilemma shapes the requirements of the type of control and the outcome depends on the 
tilt of the civilian leadership towards the “always” or “never” dilemma. During the Cold 
War the tilt of U.S. civilian leadership was towards “always” and hence delegative 
control during most of the Cold War period in order to retaliate after a first strike or 
launch on warning. It is argued that the professionalism of the U.S. armed forces made 
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the civilians accept this decision of delegative control, and in some cases “extreme 
delegative” such as nuclear submarines deployed with SLBMs without PALs. It is not 
that the Indian soldiers are not professional, but the civilian leadership has been skeptical 
seeing Pakistan’s military intervention in domestic politics.  
The civilian control pattern for INCCS needs to conform to the existing civil-
military relations in India. Peter D. Feaver has suggested four patterns of civilian control 
and they are described below in Table 11. A fifth pattern titled “modified assertive 
control” is placed along with other patterns which may suit the INCCS. 










Low/none Medium Medium High Low 




Low Low None None Very high 
 
Table 11. Patterns of Civilian Control 
 
The nature of the modified assertive control can be ascertained with questions 
starting with what, why, when, where, and how? A few suggested examples in the form 






Application Questions Responsibility 
Why nuclear weapons are required? Civilian 
What types of delivery platforms are required? Civilian 
Strategic 
What are the nuclear doctrine, policy and posture? Civilian 
What is the targeting list? Civilian and 
Military 
How many weapons are required? Civilian and 
Military 
Operational 
How nuclear operations would be conducted? Civilian and 
Military 
Which aircraft is suitable for bombing? Military 
Where should the nuclear capable aircraft or land 
based missiles be located? 
Military 
Tactical 
How the training of the crew will take place? Military 
 
Table 12. Modified Assertive Control Examples 
 
The above mentioned examples suggest that the division of labor can be divided 
into strategic, operational and tactical, with the responsibilities of strategic application 
being left to civilian and tactical application to the military, and operational aspects 
involve both civilian and military. It then emerges that in order to operationalize nuclear 
doctrine, policy, and posture established by civilian leaders, military involvement is not 
only deemed important, but is necessary. 
4. Command and Control Cycle 
The nuclear command and control cycle depends on the nuclear posture of a state. 
A bolt from the blue nuclear attack on India is unlikely from its nuclear armed neighbors. 
The recommended LAA posture does not place stringent demands on the early warning 
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systems but the surveillance systems will in any case cue the nuclear command and 














Decision Making Process (Peacetime) 
Decision Making Process (Crisis) 
Higher Defense Alert Status 
Release of Authorization and Enabling Codes 
Execution of Orders by C-in-C SFC 
Evaluation 
Data Dissemination over Communication Links 
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5. Nuclear Signaling and Alert Status of Nuclear Forces 
The de-mated posture of India poses another problem, that of nuclear signaling 
ambiguities during a crisis. The challenges and complexities of nuclear signaling are 
analogous to the theory of deterrence where deterrence can fail because the target does 
not grasp the situation, or is inclined to foolish interpretations.185 Nuclear signaling by 
India during the 2001-02 Indo-Pakistani border confrontation were attempted to convey 
clear messages, but it is not clear whether these signals were even perceived as intended 
by Pakistan or the other parties, and further it is not clear whether they were fully 
understood or even taken cognisance of, especially by Pakistan.186  Another problem 
with nuclear signaling is that within a government there are many potential actors 
(civilian, bureaucrats and military leaders) that communicate nuclear signals, which 
might not represent consistency. The nuclear signals by India during the Indian and 
Pakistani military mobilization of 2001-02 appeared confusing, and at times were at 
cross-purposes with one another.187  
The ambiguities related to nuclear signaling can not be eliminated, but with the 
attainment of a LAA posture some of them will cease to exist and instead of nuclear 
signaling, Nuclear Retaliatory Status (NRS) should be promulgated to demonstrate the 
escalation of a crisis. The NRS are the nuclear alert conditions meant for a retaliatory 
strike only and are conditions of military nuclear readiness. The recommended NRS 
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NRS States Descriptions 
NRS State V Normal peacetime condition. The manning of National Command Post (NCP), Alternate 
National Command Post (ANCP), Mobile National Command Post(MNCP), missiles 
squadrons—25 percent. 
NRS State IV Development of crisis. Manning of Posts—33 percent. 
NRS State III Crisis situation. Secondment of Air squadrons to C-in-C SFC. Manning of Posts—50 
percent. 
NRS State II Conventional or limited war in progress. SLBM capable submarines (whenever 
available with Fleet) ready with nuclear warheads. Members of NCA in NCP, ANCP, 
and MNCP. Manning of Posts—100 percent. 
NRS State I Maximum force readiness. First strike eminent. 
 
Table 13. Nuclear Retaliatory Status (NRS) States 
 
6. Financial Implications of INCCS 
The nuclear command and control system is assumed to be overly expensive as 
most of the deductions about the expenditure incurred on command and control are taken 
from the United States or the erstwhile Soviet Union. However, these deductions are 
misleading as every nuclear command and control system has a unique signature of a 
particular nuclear state. There are no hard and fast rules or any standard models for a 
nuclear command and control system. It all depends upon the nuclear doctrine, policy, 
and posture of a nuclear state. As seen in the previous chapter, 60 percent of the U.S. 
budget for the nuclear command and control is expended on intelligence resources 
(mostly early warning systems). With the envisaged INCCS, which does not include 
elaborate and sophisticated system such as the SBIRS and AEHF satellites of the United 
States, the relative cost of building INCCS within the whole nuclear operation will be 
much less than that of the United States. Moreover, the cost implications are not 
concentrated over a year or two but are spanned over several years. The utility of 
reconnaissance and communication satellites, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and 
other intelligence and communication resources are not limited to nuclear operations but 
would also assist in non-nuclear operations. The expenditure on a nuclear command and 
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control system is inescapable in order to demonstrate ‘true’ credible deterrence. Without 
the necessary finance for the nuclear command and control system, it would be like 
having a car without fuel. 
7. Measures for Negative Control 
The steps taken for strengthening negative control are a mixture of organizational 
and technical measures which are more or less based on the U.S. system. An effective 
negative control will reduce the chances of unauthorized, inadvertent or accidental use of 
nuclear weapons. 
a. Permissive Action Links 
The joint statement issued by the DAE and DRDO after the Indian nuclear 
tests in May 1998 referred to “safety interlocks.”188 Ashley J. Tellis speculates that this 
could be constraining locks built into the design of the weapon itself, similar to the 
category A and B PALs of U.S. nuclear weapons.189 However, it is not clear about the 
exact nature of the safety interlocks. India is one of the leading nations in electronic 
technology and it would not be long before India will be able to produce reliable PAL. 
The first step towards a LAA posture is to produce a foolproof PAL. 
b. Personnel Reliability Program 
A television channel in India claimed an Islamic militant group (Lashkar-
e-Tayiba) has penetrated the Indian Air Force.190 Though the claim was later denied by 
the Indian Air Force, such an event could be disastrous if it takes place in the Indian 
nuclear program. The personnel associated with nuclear duties should be screened and 
selected with the highest standards of allegiance and their conduct and behaviour should 
be constantly monitored and reviewed. 
c. Code Management 
The authenticating and enabling codes are secure as long as the code 
management is secure from unauthorized personnel. The code management for PALs and 
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EAMs should be done by an agency under the supervision of the National Security 
Advisor. The NSA is the link between the political leader and the military, and the code 
management by an agency under him would additionally strengthen the negative control. 
d. Two Man Rule 
The two man rule in the INCCS would check and ensure that an individual 
who has been cleared by the Personnel Reliability Program of India can not alone launch 
nuclear weapons, thereby further reducing the risk of unauthorized use. 
8. Measures Against Vulnerabilities 
The measure against vulnerabilities can be catered by passive and active means.  
a. Passive Measures 
For the INCCS, passive measures against vulnerabilities would be to 
provide as much redundancy in the system as possible in terms of communication links, 
command centers, and missile squadrons (fixed and mobile). Additionally, the dispersion 
and concealment of missile squadrons would provide extra measures. Most of the 
installations in INCCS should also be hardened against nuclear attacks, especially the 
command centers and fixed missile silos.   
b. Active Measures 
It is well known that attack is the best form of defense. But the Indian 
nuclear policy of retaliation only forces the decision-makers to put up a formidable active 
defense which could strike an incoming missile. Limited resources, especially financial, 
make it prudent that first the punitive intent to retaliate be strengthened, and then go for 
active defense. In this regard the nuclear posture needs to be corrected from de-mated to 
LAA first, and later active defense systems should be put up for fixed installations such 
as command and communications centers and the fixed missile silos.  
9. Command Centers 
It is proposed that INCCS have three types of command centers for controlling its 
nuclear operations: fixed, airborne and land mobile.  Current/proposed command centers 





Command Centers Location Manning Responsibility 
National Command Post (NCP) Around New Delhi CIDS 
Alternate National Comand Post 
(ANCP) 
Headquarters of C-in-C SFC C-in-C SFC 
Airborne National Command 
Post (ABNCP) 
-- C-in-C SFC 
Mobile Command Posts (MCPs) -- C-in-C SFC 
  
 Table 14. INCCS Command Centers 
 
C. OPERATIONAL 
The Chief of Integrated Defense Staff (CIDS) as the principal secretariat of COSC 
can be viewed as if the government is delaying the process of creating a post of Chief of 
Defense Staff (CDS) who would have acted as a single point military advisor to the 
government of India on similar lines of the post of CDS in Britain and Chairman Joint 
Chief of Staff (CJCS) in the United States. The post of CDS is not in the offering in the 
near future and the existing set up is going to remain. The two organizations under COSC 
(i.e., the HQIDS and SFC) should have clear demarcation of responsibilities with regard 
to nuclear operations. The functions of the two wings of COSC should be clearly 
bifurcated with HQIDS in an administrative role and SFC in an operational role in all 
matters relating to nuclear operations. It is recommended that CIDS assume the 
responsibilities of Commander USSTRATCOM and C-in-C SFC discharges the duties of 
any unified combatant commander of the United States. 
1. Role of HQIDS 
The CIDS presently heads the HQIDS and is the principal secretariat of COSC on 
all matters relating to management of Indian Armed Forces. This is a huge task which 
involves coordination of the three services in order to finally perform joint operations. 
The role played by the HQIDS in Indian nuclear operations is one of the many tasks in 
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which it is involved.191  A healthy civil-military relation is essential in nuclear operations 
and an integrated and well-informed military will assist political leaders in realizing their 
political goals. It is recommended that a two-star officer be appointed at HQIDS as 
“Administrator Strategic Forces” (ASF) who would look after the administrative military 
aspects of nuclear operations for not only C-in-C SFC but also for the government of 
India. The recommended structure for HQIDS, specifically dealing with nuclear 
operations, is depicted in Figure 20. The main directorates under the ASF could be as 
follows: 
• Directorate Nuclear Policy Plans and Targeting. This directorate would 
be the essential link between the C-in-C SFC and the NCA on the matters 
of nuclear policy, plans and targeting.  
• Directorate Inspection Team. This directorate would consist of scientists 
from DAE and DRDO and the technical officers handling armament and 
ammunition in services. It would be looking after all the maintenance and 
handling aspects of all the nuclear weapons and delivery platforms. 
• Directorate Indian Defense Communication Network. This directorate 
would look after all the C4I requirements of not only the SFC but also for 
all the services. 
• Directorate Intelligence. This directorate would look after the intelligence 
gathering and dissemination to DIA. The directorate would also assist in 
running the proposed NCP located around New Delhi. The personnel in 
this directorate could come from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 
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Figure 20.   Recommended Structure for HQDIS
Chief of Integrated Defense Staff (CIDS) 
Administrator Strategic Forces (ASF) 
Directorate Nuclear 











2. Role of C-in-C SFC 
The role of C-in-C SFC is to manage and administer all the strategic forces of 
India. As an operational commander, the C-in-C SFC will be responsible for nuclear 
operations, intelligence gathering, training of personnel under his command, and to 
provide feedback to nuclear scientists of DAE and DRDO through an in-house Research 
and Development (R&D) unit. The recommended role, functions and responsibilities of 
C-in-C SFC are covered in the succeeding subparagraphs.  
a. Provide Teeth and Fangs to C-in-C SFC 
The LAA nuclear posture asks for at least one of the delivery platforms of 
the triad to have assembled nuclear weapons. The command and control of land-based 
nuclear missiles can provide the necessary assertive control required by civilian leaders 
and the land-based missiles can also be a source of credible deterrence against India’s 
nuclear adversaries. Presently two Indian missiles, Prithvi and Agni, are suitable for such 
missions which can be placed under the operational control of C-in-C SFC. According to 
Major General Ashok Mehta (Retd.), the 333 and 334 Prithvi Missile Group under 
raising, along with Agni I manned by Army Artillery Corp, will become integral to 
SFC.192 However, the nuclear assets under C-in-C SFC are not known to the public. R. 
Prasannan, a defense analyst, asks whether SFC will have its own bomber squadrons or 
would they be borrowed from the Air Force who would keep the warhead, the DAE or 
the SFC.193 In order to accomplish the LAA posture, the operational responsibilities of C-
in-C SFC could be as follows: 
• Some of the Prithvi squadrons and all the Agni missile squadrons (present 
and future) are placed under the operational command of C-in-C SFC. The 
Agni missiles should have the fixed (in silos) and mobile versions, 
whereas the short range Prithvi missiles should only be mobile. 
• The Air squadrons such as Jaguars, Mirage 2000 and Su-30 MKI should 
be seconded to C-in-C SFC under NRS state III. However these squadrons 
should come under C-in-C SFC at least two times in a year for nuclear 
specific training. 
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• The SLBM capable nuclear submarines, when available with the Fleet, 
should be placed under the control of C-in-C SFC in NRS state II and the 
channel of communications could be through the available Indian naval 
communication systems.  
• The C-in-C SFC should provide strategic intelligence to the DIA. The 
intelligence gathering systems such as satellites, UAVs, radars and Signal 
Intelligence systems (SIGINT) which includes Electronic Intelligence 
(ELINT) and Communication Intelligence (COMINT) should then be 
placed under operational control of C-in-C SFC. 
 
b. Operational Headquarters of C-in-C SFC 
The C-in-C SFC, an operational commander, should not be stationed at 
New Delhi. The proposed ASF under CIDS should be located around New Delhi and 
should look after all the administrative requirements of C-in-C SFC with COSC and the 
government of India. It is recommended that C-in-C SFC be located somewhere in 
central India from where he can control the nuclear assets under his command in the 
North, North-West and North-Eastern parts of India. It is further recommended that the 
headquarters of C-in-C SFC be designated as ANCP. 
c. Training 
An operational commander of any Armed Forces around the world carries 
out two main tasks: warfighting and training. Since a nuclear war has never been fought 
there is no useful doctrine available for nuclear warfighting. The nuclear training is 
essential as it is required to minimize accidents and strengthen the ‘always’ dilemma 
when the weapons are employed for use. No training is complete in the military without 
structured classroom instructions and there is a need for establishment of a nuclear school 
in which personnel of SFC and scientists of DAE and DRDO are trained. It is 
recommended that an Indian Nuclear Weapons School (INWS) be established under the 
command of C-in-C SFC to train personnel of SFC and scientists of DAE and DRDO in 
aspects relating to handling, maintenance and usage of nuclear weapons. The INWS can 




d. Organization of SFC  
The recommended organization of SFC under an officer of the rank of 
Lieutenant General and equivalent is depicted in Figure 21. The main directorates under 
C-in-C SFC could be as follows: 
• Directorate Operations. This directorate would look after the day-to-day 
nuclear operations of Prithvi, Agni and Air squadrons of India. 
• Directorate Intelligence. This directorate would be involved in strategic 
intelligence and would have sub-directorates of UAV, satellite, Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement intelligence (MASINT), radar and 
SIGINT. 
• Directorate Arms Inspection. This directorate would be looking after 
maintenance and handling aspects of all the nuclear weapons and delivery 
platforms. 
• Directorate Technical. This directorate would look after the maintenance 
and handling aspects of all C4I2 assets under C-in-C SFC. 
• Directorate Training. This directorate would look after the training of 
personnel of SFC and scientists of DAE and DRDO. The proposed INWS 
could come under this directorate.   
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Figure 21.   Recommended Organization of SFC
Commander-in-Chief Strategic Forces 
Command (C-in-C SFC) 


























The technical aids for INCCS are envisaged in the DND which range from 
command, control, communications, computing, intelligence and information (C4I2) 
systems to space based and other assets to provide early warning, communications and 
damage assessment. The digital technology has rapidly changed the way wars are fought 
today. The rapid growth of digital technology requires an organization at a national level 
which has a joint vision for all three services of India. In the United States, the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a combat support agency responsible for 
planning, engineering, acquiring, fielding, and supporting global net-centric solutions to 
serve the needs of the President, Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and other DoD 
Components, under all conditions of peace and war.194 The core mission areas of DISA 
are: communications, combat support computing, information assurance, joint command 
and control, and joint interoperability support. In India there is a need for an organization 
similar to DISA to look after the requirements of the Indian defense ministry. It is 
therefore recommended that a civilian organization under DRDO be established as Indian 
Defense Information Systems (IDIS) to plan, field, and maintain an integrated C4I2 
system that would serve the Armed Forces of India. The C4I2 system planned under IDIS 
for strategic forces should cater to three main and essential tasks: to provide intelligence 
to NCA to make decisions, to provide command centers the necessary communication 
links, computers, command and control decision aids, and to provide redundant 
capabilities to communicate the orders from NCA to C-in-C SFC and his subordinate 
commanders. Apart from the requirements of a C4I2 system and space based systems 
which are envisaged in the DND for command and control of nuclear forces of India, 
additionally PALs would also be required to fulfill the demands of LAA nuclear posture. 
The technical aspects of INCCS are mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs. 
1. C4I2 Systems 
The C4I2 systems are essential for today’s battle space management. The data 
fusion, filteration and dissemination are main functions of a C4I2 system. The need for an 
effective command, control, communication, computer, intelligence and interoperable 
                                                 
194 Defense Information Systems Agency, “About DISA,” 
http://www.disa.mil/main/about/missman.html [Accessed July 17, 2006]. 
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system (C4I2) has been felt and a Data Fusion Centre (DFC), a module of national C4I2, 
is being conceptualized to function as the decision support system for the National 
Command Authority at the National Command Post (NCP).195 The communication 
systems in the C4I2 framework are the bedrock on which the effectiveness of the C4I2 
system is ascertained. The communication links for nuclear operations should be based 
on a wide variety of communication systems including optical fiber lines, troposcatter, 
radio and satellites to provide redundancy. The Indian Army has embarked on a fully 
automated communication network for its field forces and termed it as Army Radio 
Engineering Network (AREN), whereas the Indian Air Force has planned for a dedicated 
communication network for its air defense under Air Defense Ground Environment 
System (ADGES).196 The AREN and ADGES systems should also be integrated with the 
proposed NCP and ANCP in order to control the nuclear assets under C-in-C SFC. 
Additionally, mobile command and communication centers should be operated by C-in-C 
SFC. The future nuclear submarines capable of launching SLBMs should be controlled 
through available communication channels of the Indian Navy. Before the SLBM capable 
submarine joins the Fleet, a redundant system in the form of TACAMO system should be 
checked for reliability of communications with a submerged submarine. 
The requirements of elaborate intelligence systems do not exist in view of the 
short flight time of an incoming missile from India’s nuclear armed neighbors. However, 
intelligence systems such as satellites which could provide imagery and UAVs for 
reconnaissance are absolutely essential for monitoring and promulgation of forewarning. 
2. Space Based Assets 
The space based assets in the INCCS could be tasked for two main functions: 
communications and reconnaissance. The communications should be made available in 
the form of data as well as voice. The satellite based reconnaissance would provide early 
warning as well as damage assessment after a nuclear detonation. There is no dedicated 
defense satellite and INSAT series of satellites do meet some of the requirements of 
                                                 
195 IDS, “HQIDS Report.” 
196 Anand, “Joint Development.” 
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defense communications.197 For the space based surveillance, India launched Technology 
Experiment Satellites (TES) in 2001, which has a high resolution camera with a 
resolution of one meter. The images beamed by TES are analyzed by defense Image 
processing and Application Center (DIPAC), which is manned by personnel from the 
three services.198 
The INCCS requirement in the space segment is a constellation of satellites which 
could have communication and surveillance payloads. These payloads are not INCCS 
specific and could also be used during a conventional war or during peacetime military 
operations. The military satellites differ from the commercial satellites in four aspects:  
military satellites should additionally employ encryption, be nuclear hardened, have 
better resolution and have anti-jamming capabilities. It has been deduced by the Indian 
strategic planners that the country would require a constellation of approximately six 
dedicated surveillance satellites if New Delhi seeks to observe the status of critical 
facilities and formations in China and Pakistan twice or thrice daily.199 A set of dedicated 
military satellites will give the Armed Forces of India a significant edge and will be a 
force multiplier with respect to early warning, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
communications. 
3. PALs 
The PALs are essential for INCCS as they establish the necessary negative control 
required by civilian leadership for the deployed nuclear weapons. The achievement of 
India toward attainment of PAL technology is not known. 
E. SECONDARY EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR COMMAND AND 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
The command and control facilities recommended for INCCS have secondary 
uses. The system under INCCS has robust communication facilities and provides an 
excellent command platform for decision-making which could be utilized in non-nuclear 
roles. The secondary roles of INCCS are mentioned below: 
                                                 
197 Anand, “Joint Development.” 
198 Hindustan Times, “India to Launch series of Spy Satellites,” February 13, 2002. 
199 The Hindu, “Spy Satellite Launch by Year –End,” July 2, 2000. 
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• The facilities of INCCS could be used in joint military operations or 
during a conventional or limited war. 
• With the help of NCP civilian leadership at New Delhi, whenever it 
desires, can monitor the military operations in India including the 
operations against terrorists.  
• The INCCS could be used in major natural disaster such as tsunami, 
earthquake, floods, cyclones, etc. The management during these times 
could be regulated using the INCCS. 
 
G. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES 
On March 2, 2006, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh announced an initiative to develop a strategic global partnership 
between the United States and India. The initiative states that the United States and India 
are “building the foundation of a durable defense relationship that will continue to 
support [their] common strategic and security interest.”200 The most significant aspect of 
President Bush’s strategic global partnership with India is his proposal to normalize 
nuclear cooperation. This strategic partnership is expected to blossom in the years to 
come. The cooperation with the United States for the development of INCCS can be 
extended in two fields. 
First, the assistance from the United States in developing PALs would help India 
in strengthening its negative control over nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of 
unauthorized use. The United States shared detailed information about PAL design with 
the British, apparently in an attempt to encourage such devices in Britain’s independent 
arsenal, and made similar overtures to France.201  This kind of assistance is not possible 
by the United States within the purview of Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But if the 
rules of NPT are interpreted such that the development of PALs would absolve the 
requirement of testing Indian PAL, thereby India could stick to its moratorium on further 
nuclear tests. It is pertinent to note here that PALs are weapon specific and no country 
                                                 
200 The White House, “Fact Sheet: United States and India: Strategic Partnership,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/print/20060302-13.html [Accessed June 5, 2006].   
201 Shaun Gregory, “The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons,” (Peace Research 
Report no. 13, University of Bradford, December 1986), 24; and Richard Ullman, “The Covert French 
Connection,” Foreign Policy, no.75 (Summer 1989): 13-16. 
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would like to divulge this information. In this regard, Indian scientists can be trained in 
the U.S. on the general aspects of PALs and later these scientists can figure out specific 
PALs for Indian nuclear weapons. 
Second, the United States, during their annual exercises (code named 
MALABAR), along with the Indian Navy can transmit VLF messages using their 
TACAMO aircraft to Indian submarines to see the efficacy of the TACAMO VLF 
system. If the exercise goes well, maybe India could buy TACAMO aircraft or build one 
with U.S. assistance for India’s future nuclear submarines.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The nuclear command and control system of a country is based on its nuclear 
doctrine, policy and posture. The nuclear doctrine, policy and posture provide the 
necessary guidance for building each block of the command and control system. The 
Draft Nuclear Doctrine of India promulgates the policies of NFU and minimum credible 
deterrence and the nuclear posture of de-mated. It can be argued that NFU and de-mated 
posture does not correspond to minimum credible deterrence against nuclear armed 
neighbors of India. The mating of nuclear weapons during a crisis poses many problems, 
including safety risks, and is more de-stabilizing as the adversary perceives it as highly 
threatening. 
The recommended LAA nuclear posture of India with a ready use delivery 
platform in the form of land based missiles will act as a ‘true’ credible deterrent against 
Pakistan and China. The shift of the nuclear posture of India from de-mated to LAA 
would ask for active involvement of the Indian Armed Forces and technical and 
organizational measures to strengthen negative control. The proposed ASF under CIDS 
should look after the administrative needs of C-in-C SFC and government of India. It is 
recommended that the C-in-C SFC, an operational commander of nuclear forces, should 
be based away from New Delhi and Prithvi and Agni squadrons be placed under his 
operational command. In order to implement the LAA posture, new C4I2 systems would 
have to complement the existing systems and satellite based assets will be required for 
communications and reconnaissance. 
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The proposed INCCS would also supplement the non-nuclear operations and 
assist the national leaders during national disasters. Cooperation with the United States 
should be sought for development of PALs and a TACAMO system which would assist 
INCCS in strengthening negative control and in building a robust command and control 






































 V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
India became a nuclear weapon state on May 11, 1998 after detonating a series of 
nuclear devices in Pokhran. The overt demonstration of nuclear weapons capabilities has 
highlighted the promulgation of nuclear doctrine, policy, posture and eventually the 
nuclear command and control in the forefront of affairs. The formulation of NSAB and 
its recommendations on nuclear doctrine in the form of DND, and acceptance of DND by 
CCS on January 4, 2003, established the necessary foundation for nuclear operations in 
India. The nuclear policies of NFU and the “minimum credible deterrence” are the origin 
as well as the end product of nuclear operations in India. The nuclear posture which is the 
intermediate product between the foundation and the end product is dictated by threat, 
civil-military relations, technology available and the necessary budget available for 
carrying out the nuclear operations. The command and control of nuclear weapons is a 
derivative of nuclear posture which links the strategic requirements of civilian leadership 
to the operational aspects of the military. It is a link which connects the strategic concept 
to the nuclear weapons. If the nuclear command and control link is not there or is broken 
then the strategic concept and the nuclear weapons have no meaning in itself. 
The strategic culture of a country hardly changes as is evident in India’s case 
where it has denounced nuclear weapons since its independence. The strategic security 
concerns had forced India to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities, but then the strategic 
culture of India played its role in still denouncing the weapons as India adopted the 
policy of NFU. The nuclear posture requires a periodic review in order to apply the 
necessary changes to the nuclear command and control system. 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Adherence to NFU 
India is determined to abide by its NFU policy and will follow it to the letter and 
spirit whether or not a bilateral or multilateral deal on NFU is achieved with Pakistan or 
China. It can be argued that NFU policy and retaliatory strike only of India may not 
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necessarily demonstrate the required deterrence, especially against China which has far 
more superior nuclear forces and missiles. It is well understood that a weaker side is 
unlikely to assume a nuclear policy of NFU, but the discard of nuclear weapons use and 
the notion that they are not meant for war fighting determines the essence of the strategic 
culture of India. Nuclear policies are not country specific and are solely dependent on the 
strategic culture of a nation. The NFU policy of India marks its intent to maintain 
strategic stability in the region by sending out signals to both its adversaries to follow the 
path of restraint. Pakistan’s concept of first use against India when it is engaged in 
domestic destabilization of Pakistan is ironical as it is Pakistan who is involved in 
domestic destabilization of India, however India has not responded with a similar first use 
threat. 
2. Minimum Credible Deterrence and Nuclear Posture 
The “minimum credible deterrence” is country specific as deterrence can be 
evaluated differently by different countries. Therefore, what it takes to deter China will 
not be similar to what it takes to deter Pakistan. The deterrence against China is not only 
weak because of inferiority of nuclear forces of India in terms of quality and quantity, but 
also due to the fact that India can not target many main cities in China including 
Beijing202. Once “minimum credible deterrence” against China and Pakistan has been 
ascertained then a commensurate nuclear posture should be formulated. Again, a de-
mated posture might be viable against Pakistan but whether or not it poses a credible 
deterrence against China is difficult to gauge. The mating of weapons during a crisis is a 
destabilizing factor as an adversary can perceive it to be threatening and might be 
tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike. 
3. Important Aspects of the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System  
The United States has been carrying out nuclear operations for more than six 
decades and has established a robust nuclear command and control system. Important 
deductions from the United States nuclear operations are as follows: 
                                                 
202 W. P. S. Sidhu, “A Languid but Lethal Arms Race,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-
art2115.pdf#search=%22India%20can%20not%20target%20Chinese%20cities%20including%20Beijing%
2CJasjit%20Singh%20%22 [Accessed September 1, 2006]. 
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• The movement of supreme authority and its designate successors 
authorized to release nuclear weapons are monitored by a central agency 
at all times so that during a crisis after the first strike the country is not 
bereft of political leadership.   
• The NPR 2001 posits the integration of nuclear capabilities with 
conventional strike capabilities. The concept is to deter those countries 
which do not possess nuclear weapons as the credibility of the United 
States using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear rogue states is weak. 
• The LOW posture is extremely demanding on the early warning systems 
and is fraught with false alarms. 
• Elaborate redundancy is maintained in the command centers which are 
land based, airborne, and mobile. 
• Elaborate redundancy is maintained in communication links with main 
thrust on satellite communications. For submarine communications, the 
entire world is covered with an ELF station in the United States and as 
many as nine VLF/LF stations worldwide. 
• The negative control over United States nuclear operations is strengthened 
through PALs, PRP, two-man rule, and through efficient code-
management of authenticating and enabling codes for the nuclear 
weapons. 
• The United States command and control system vulnerabilities are 
overcome through EMP hardening of systems, promulgation and tracking 
the movements of president and his successors, and through active and 
passive defenses against physical destruction. 
• The financial implication of a nuclear command and control system in the 
nuclear operation amounts to nineteen percent, and sixty percent of it goes 
to intelligence gathering systems.  
4. Civil-Military Relations in India 
The civil-military relations define the nature of a nuclear command and control 
system, i.e., delegative or assertive. The civil-military relations in India are unique from 
rest of the world. Former Army Chief of Staff, General V. P. Malik, sums up the position 
of the armed forces in strategic aspects. According to him, “the armed forces of India are 
kept out of the national security loop and were not adequately consulted by the 
government on operational and strategic matters.”203 The non-involvement of the 
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professional military of India on all aspects of strategic concern devoid the decision 
making process of a necessary and valuable input. 
5. Absence of a Common Communications Backbone 
Any future military operations require joint effort, and thus reliable joint 
communications will play an important role toward accomplishing the assigned tasks. 
Similarly, nuclear operations are not conducted in isolation and unity in efforts will be 
the hallmark for successful and accident free operations. The lack of joint architecture of 
command, control, and communications system in the defense forces of India204 would 
be a set-back to nuclear operations. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP FOR INDIAN NUCLEAR 
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
1. LAA Nuclear Posture 
Nuclear posture is an important criterion in determining the credibility of 
deterrence. The de-mated nuclear posture of India is easy to maintain during peacetime 
but poses challenging tasks during transition from peacetime to crisis in the form of 
potential ambiguities in nuclear signaling about the intent, raises questions about safety 
because of hurried nuclear operations, creates more instability in the crisis when the 
adversary is aware of possible mating of nuclear weapons, and the inherent problems 
associated with the coordination of mating when three different organizations are 
involved (military, DAE, and DRDO). Apart from these challenges the de-mated posture 
does not display a credible deterrence against India’s adversaries. It is presumed that the 
ready use nuclear arsenal of China will force the United States to work cautiously over a 
crisis involving Taiwan. Similarly, the intent to retaliate is best demonstrated when India 
deploys its nuclear weapons in the LAA posture with mated land based ballistic missiles. 
The limited war doctrine suitably applies to an inferior Pakistan and there is no other 
option left for India in order to dissuade Pakistan from creating domestic instability in 
India. The “minimum credible deterrence” against China and Pakistan is depicted in 
Figure 22. It is recommended that Indian nuclear posture be evolved around the LAA 
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posture with ready-use nuclear armed land-based ballistic missiles in order to 




Figure 22.   Minimum credible Deterrence against China and Pakistan 
 
2. Division of Labor in Civil-Military Relations 
The civil-military relations in the LAA posture move toward integrating the 
Indian Armed Forces into the decision-making process relating to strategic aspects of 
India. Whether the nuclear weapons are deployed or not, eventually the military will be 
involved as it will be the military who will execute the orders. According to Rear 
Admiral Raja Menon (Retd.), there is no organization other than the armed forces that 
could be trusted with the nuclear weapons, but at the same time the politicians, used as he 
is to his own standards of morality, is unsure of the consequences of handing over the 
weapons to the services.205 The armed forces of India are a professional force and have 
                                                 
















discharged their duties responsibly and with the utmost dedication. In a democracy, what 
matters most in civil-military relations is the division of labor. Once the division of labor 
has been demarcated then half of the conflicts are solved before they erupt. It is 
recommended that for nuclear operations in India the division of labor be segregated into 
strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic element will be totally under the domain 
of politicians and tactical under the purview of military leaders. The operational element 
requires joint understanding between the political and military leaders so as to make the 
strategic element formulated by the civilian leaders transform into the tactical element 
pursued by the military. 
3. Operational Assets of C-in-C SFC 
The C-in-C SFC should have certain operational assets in order to demonstrate its 
operational capabilities. The secondment of missiles and air squadrons will have the 
problems associated with equipment which are placed under operational control of a 
commander for a short duration. These problems include administrative, maintenance, 
command and control, and training. It is recommended that C-in-C SFC be operationally 
responsible for all the nuclear armed short range and ballistic missiles of India. The C-in-
C SFC should also have under his command the intelligence gathering systems such as 
satellites, UAVs, radars, ELINT and COMINT systems so that he can assess the strategic 
situation and report appropriately to his higher commands. The operational headquarters 
of C-in-C SFC should be located somewhere in central India from where he could control 
the operational assets placed under his command. 
4. Technical Aspects of Command and Control 
In order to deploy a ready use nuclear arsenal in the LAA posture, the first and 
foremost capability which is required in the Indian context is the manufacture of PALs. 
The C4I2 systems and the space based assets will provide necessary support in the 
decision-making process by providing early warning, surveillance, reconnaissance and 
communications. 
5. Command Centers 
It is recommended that a hardened NCP be located around New Delhi with the 
manning responsibility entrusted with CIDS and the ANCP be the headquarters of C-in-C 
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SFC. In addition, ABNCP and MCPs should be procured or manufactured and placed 
under the command of C-in-C SFC. 
6. Negative Control 
The negative control of nuclear operations is strengthened by using PALs, PRP, 
two-man rule and through efficient code-management of authenticating and enabling 
codes. 
7. Alert Status of Nuclear Forces 
It is recommended that alert status of nuclear forces be signaled through 
attainment of NRS. This way some of the present ambiguities related with nuclear 
signaling can be eliminated. 
8. Roadmap for INCCS 
The nuclear command and control system of a nuclear weapon state takes time to 
fully emerge as a robust system. The roadmap for INCCS can be divided into short-term, 
mid-term, and long-term goals. The events associated with the roadmap of INCCS are 
shown in Table 14. 
Short-term (Up to 3 years) Mid-term (3-5 years) Long-term (over 5 years) 
Promulgation of successor(s) to 
Prime Minister 
Deployment of Land based 
missiles in LAA posture 
Identify location and 
infrastructure for C-in-C SFC and 
ASF 
Dedicated military satellites 
Creation of NCP, ANCP and 
mobile canters 
Manufacture of PALs 
Training of Air squadrons with 
C-in-C SFC 
Joint C4I2 system for the three 
services 
Development of Anti Missile 
Defense 
 





The nuclear command and control system links the strategic concepts of a country 
to the nuclear weapons. Neither the strategic concepts nor the nuclear weapons 
themselves demonstrate deterrence, but it is demonstrated by the nuclear posture 
permeated through the nuclear command and control system. The nuclear command and 
control system of India is evolving cautiously to fulfill the requirements of DND. The 
LOW posture is certainly not the option for India as the short flight time of the missiles 
from the adversaries leave very little time for a LOW retaliation. The current de-mated 
posture is suitable for an inferior Pakistan but the credibility of deterrence is doubtful 
against China. The deployment of nuclear weapons in the LAA posture with nuclear 
armed ballistic missiles ready for use would definitely deter China in any future conflict. 
The intent to retaliate with a handful of nuclear capable missiles in the LAA posture will 
be the “minimum credible deterrence” against China. The intent and waging of a limited 
war should dissuade Pakistan from domestically destabilizing India, leaving the nuclear 
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